On January 30, U.S. Defense One** published an article by Kimberly Lane, a senior associate at the Center for Strategic and International Studies (who served as chairman of the House Armed Services Committee), "Changing the Pacific Deterrence Plan to Deter China." The article argues that the Pentagon has waited too long for Congress to pass a budget for the fiscal year, and that achieving this goal seems more difficult than ever to achieve, despite consensus on a Pacific deterrence plan with broad bipartisan support in the United States. Therefore, to achieve the important goals of the Pacific Deterrence Program, changes need to be made and three things need to be done.
The USS Yukon and USS Ronald Reagan transited in the South China Sea on October 27, 2023. U.S. Navy ** Petty Officer Jordan Brown.
The Pacific Deterrence Initiative (PDI) did not live up to expectations
In recent years, the United States has constantly adjusted its global strategy and listed China as its main strategic competitor. On the one hand, it vigorously exaggerates the "China threat theory"; On the other hand, it is used as an excuse to pursue the so-called Indo-Pacific strategy. In April 2020, the Pentagon proposed the Pacific Deterrence Initiative (PDI), which aims to unite partners to take measures to deter China, following the European Threat Strategy (EDI).
But the article argues that the PDI was proposed out of dissatisfaction with the Pentagon's slow and incomplete measures. For the second year in a row, the National Defense Authorization Act requires the Pentagon to report specifically to Congress on what additional resources are needed to deter China. The Pentagon did not do this.
A sense of urgency in the Pacific, as well as dissatisfaction with the Pentagon, prompted Congress to create PDI under the NDAA (National Defense Authorization Act) of 2021. Congress authorized the PDI to provide new funding for a variety of purposes, including**Integrated Air and Missile Defense systems, additional funding for rotational troops, prepositioned ammunition, and logistics; funding programs for military build-up, strengthening the capabilities of allies and partners; and joint training and exercises. The bill also mandates that the commander of Indo-Pacific Command report annually to Congress on the resource requirements for PDI.
However, the PDI proposal has not met expectations in the past four years. Despite improvements in some areas, the Department of Defense has primarily used PDI as a budget showcase for theater-related projects, rather than as a strategic plan to invest and increase military capabilities. As such, it also fails to meet the needs identified by Indo-Pacific Command's independent assessment, which is "specifically designed to convince potential adversaries that any preemptive military action will be costly and likely to fail by projecting credible combat power in times of crisis" and provides "several flexible deterrence options, including full implementation of operational plans in the event of deterrence failure." ”
However, in the U.S. 2024 budget proposal,** $8.1 billion is requested for PDI, which is far less than the $15.4 billion required assessed by Indo-Pacific Command. However, in the 2024 NDAA, which Biden** signed into law last month, Congress increased that amount by $5 billion, or 47%. In particular, Congress has increased funding for several projects on Indo-Pacific Command's unfunded priority list, including campaigns, ammunition and investments in an initial prototype that provides a distributed, resilient joint firepower network for command and control. It's a start, but it also shows a huge gap between what Congress and Indo-Pacific Command think is needed and what the Office of the Secretary of Defense and the Office of Management and Budget specify.
Importantly, year after year, the gap between needs and the funding to meet them accumulates, making it increasingly difficult to catch up within important timelines. For example, it will take years to complete the required military construction projects that require the storage and pre-deployment of equipment and ammunition, as well as the improvement of military and defense infrastructure, bases, logistics, while guaranteed access will take years to complete – and we may not have years.
*: Kimberly Lane.
More funding is needed for the Pacific Deterrence Initiative
The article notes that as China's increasingly assertive stance and the Chinese leadership's rhetoric about recovering Taiwan grows, the window for the United States to provide credible deterrence that can bring about change is rapidly closing. Indo-Pacific Command has outlined several key priorities (see chart below), which include defending key U.S. military sites, including **, deploying critical munitions and equipment at the forward edge, training U.S. forces in their ability to enhance the combat effectiveness of joint forces, and enhancing our coordination with our allies. However, many of the necessary objectives that it had stated had not been achieved or funded.
It is therefore important that adequate funding for the deterrence program be provided. To put it simply, time is running out. Because the pace of China's military operations and military modernization in the region is rapidly accelerating. China's top brass said that the "reunification" of Taiwan and the mainland is a "historical inevitability" and an "inevitable." So the United States should take these words seriously.
The article emphasizes that our military must have reliable capabilities capable of projecting power in the Indo-Pacific, protecting our military, and meeting our treaty obligations. With this strength and in close coordination with our allies and partners, our actions must be aimed at preventing China from waking up one day and deciding to test America's resolve.
The next budget cycle and subsequent years will be critical to truly demonstrate that the commander's stated resource needs are being met. Our political views are on the same page. We need to act to fully fund the Pacific Deterrence Initiative and the resource needs of commanders. Now is the time to do so.
*: Kimberly Lane.
How to help PDI achieve its important goals
The article argues that in order to deter China, the United States needs to change its Pacific deterrence program. However, for two years in a row, the National Defense Authorization Act required the Pentagon to report specifically to Congress on what additional resources were needed to deter China, but the Pentagon did not do so. Therefore, to help PDI achieve its important goals, the article makes three recommendations, the core of which is the need to provide "extra" funding ("extra" here means beyond the plan, not just beyond past spending).
First, the PDI should provide additional funding for programs to improve U.S. posture and capabilities west of the International Date Line to enhance deterrence. These include:
Defense system. Establish a permanent integrated air-to-surface missile defense system to protect ** from ballistic, hypersonic and cruise missiles, while laying the groundwork for future offensive capabilities. The island is an important operational and logistical base, as well as the key to winning any long-term fighting in the region.
**Ammunition. Manufacture, buy, and ship a complete line of precision strikes against long-range, medium-range, and tactical targets in the Pacific**. These ** include Sea Strike Tomahawks (MST); Precision Strike Missile - Increment 2 (PRSM); Standard missile 6 (SM6-1B modification); Long-range anti-ship missiles (LRASM) and joint strike missiles, joint air-to-surface standoff missiles, sea-based missiles, and the MK 48 advanced torpedo, among others, are critical to protecting forward-deployed forces from enemy countermeasures designed to drive the United States out of the region.
Fuel storage and presetting equipment. Deploy fuel, military equipment and ammunition for operations and resupply when there are no longer permanent U.S. military installations in the area. In times of conflict, it takes too long to transport these supplies across the Pacific.
Respond to the challenges of the operational environment. As part of a sustained, synchronized set of operations, activities, and investments in the Western Pacific and Indian Oceans, provide the ability to rapidly assemble forces multiple times a year to familiarize and train troops to meet the challenges associated with the operational environment and what happens in the event of a failure of satellite, communications, and air defense systems.
Indo-Pacific Mission Network(also known as the mission partner environment). Provide the ability to securely communicate and collaborate with multiple allies and partners, and modernize command, control, communications, and computer and information technology infrastructure to ensure command and control in a competitive environment.
Military construction and design. Funding for small military construction allows Indo-Pacific Command to use existing authority to rapidly develop and deliver facility requirements. This infrastructure will store equipment, front-end kits, and other smaller facilities to provide a more distributed footprint.
Joint experimentation, innovation and training. Funding theater-wide exercises to enhance the ability of joint and combined forces to conduct all-domain operations in a competitive environment.
Safe cooperation. **Title 10 U.S.C. Section 333, Training and Equipment; USC Section 332, Institutional Capacity Building; and the Maritime Security Initiative (MSI) authorities to develop key capabilities of theater allies and partners to enhance integrated deterrence.
Second, Congress should ensure that PDI has its own appropriation account or total debt mandate, rather than a subset of the region's broader Department of Defense budget. PDI is intended to complement other activities and is not a new tab attached to already planned events and program directories. The inclusion of PDI in a larger account masks the real resources needed to fund the needs of Indopacom. Earmarked and ongoing allocations to enhance posture and capabilities west of the International Date Line, or TOAs, must include immediate and long-term investments in the capabilities required to carry out the operations commander. Recent events remind us that we need more and that we should not increase our funding in the Pacific simply by divesting from Europe and the Middle East.
Third, PDI funding must be sustained. and builds on the progress made by the Department of Defense over the past few years on Force Posture Access agreements, including the announcement of four enhanced defense cooperation agreement locations in the Philippines, actions with Australia and Japan; The Quadrilateral Partnership of India, Australia, Japan, and the United States, including support for Japan's decision to acquire new capabilities to enhance regional deterrence, providing self-defense capabilities to Taiwan, and strengthening internal cooperation; and deepening trilateral relations with South Korea and Japan. This progress strengthens our alliances and coordination with key partners, strengthens their defensive resilience, and strengthens our deterrence posture against adversary threats in the region. We should use PDI to make the posture of the United States and its allies more credible and resilient.
Brief analysis
The Pacific Deterrence Program is a comprehensive "deterrent China" initiative developed by the United States to combat great power competition. The Deterrence Initiative was introduced in the context of the European Deterrence Initiative (EDI), which was introduced in 2014. The U.S. Department of Defense committed $22 billion to the European Deterrence Initiative, which was used to meet operational needs to contain Russia: additional troop presences, exercises, predeployment, infrastructure and partner capacity-building. That year's National Defense Authorization Act called for $4.5 billion for the European Deterrence Program, about double the funding of the Pacific Deterrence Program.
The European Deterrence Initiative is designed to increase funding to improve the posture of U.S. European Command and strengthen deterrence against Russia. It requires the commander of EU Command and the Office of the Minister of Defense to strategically consider how the region should be deployed, which forces should rotate in the region, and other training, exercises, and key capabilities needed to conduct operations.
It is important that EDI is fully funded in the first few years of its implementation, allowing additional funds to be invested in specific projects, rather than just relabeling projects that are already underway. Each year, European Command and the Office of the Secretary of Defense review the program to take a comprehensive, strategic look at what is needed to further improve U.S. posture and capabilities, and report their findings to Congress.
While many of EDI's investments have been welcomed and met by need, the outbreak of the Russia-Ukraine conflict on February 24, 2022, has declared a complete failure of the European Deterrence Initiative.
The U.S. "Pacific Deterrence Program" is a product inspired by the "European Deterrence Program", and its core is aimed at "deterring China." However, the nearly four years of implementation of the plan not only failed to meet its strategic expectations, but also exposed many problems in the implementation of the plan. One is that the Pentagon primarily uses PDI as a budget showcase for theater-related programs, rather than as a strategic plan to fund and enhance military capabilities; second, the failure to meet the needs identified by the Independent Indo-Pacific Command Assessment, which was specifically designed to deter potential adversaries, and failed to meet any of its objectives; Third, the key issue is still money. The three suggestions put forward by American experts all revolve around money, the first is to "extra" funds, the second is to allocate funds, and then to continue to guarantee funds; Fourth, the funding and implementation of the plan reflects the huge gap and contradiction between what Congress and Indo-Pacific Command believe are needed and what is designated by the Office of the Secretary of Defense and the Office of Management and Budget.
According to the analysis, the wrong strategy and poor policy will inevitably lead to failure. The strategic failures of the United States in Iraq and Afghanistan in recent years illustrate this point. Now the United States is deeply involved in the conflict between Russia and Ukraine in Europe and the Palestinian-Israeli crisis in the Middle East, but the United States seems to be unwilling to accept it, and has begun to manipulate the "Pacific Deterrence Plan" again when the "European Deterrence Plan" has failed. Although the United States has reached a bipartisan agreement on the implementation of the PDI and is willing to provide adequate funding for the Pacific Deterrence Program and the resource needs of the Indo-Pacific Commander, in the context of the wrong strategy and poor policies, the "Pacific Deterrence Program" promoted by politicians is bound to fail.