The form of sea power refers to the specific types and manifestations of sea power. Due to the differences in location, topography, sea environment, traffic conditions, and other influencing factors, there are obvious differences in the allocation of military forces, the scope of action, the mode of control, and the difficulty of control, and their strategic value is also different. They can be specifically divided into the following 8 types:
1.Ocean sea power
Open-ocean sea power refers to a country's control over the global ocean region, in whole or in part, by virtue of its powerful maritime power.
Ocean sea power has the following characteristics:1It is the most difficult type of sea power, requiring one or more fleets suitable for ocean-going operations, with a radius sufficient to cover the central area of a certain ocean. This requires a multifaceted military capability that can only be possessed by a global maritime power; 2.It generally refers to the control of the deep area of the ocean, but most of the specific control actions are carried out in the marginal sea or intercontinental sea area near the continent. 3.The most important value of ocean sea power lies in maintaining the order of global ocean shipping in peacetime, monitoring and deterring the maritime commercial shipping and military operations of potential hostile countries, ensuring the safety and smooth flow of ocean transportation of ships of its own and allied countries in wartime, and intercepting and blocking the ocean shipping of enemy countries. 4.Ocean power itself consists of three levels, from high to low: overall control over the world's major oceans; complete control over a certain ocean; Partial control of an ocean. Among them, the highest level of ocean control can only be achieved by global maritime hegemony, such as Britain's control of the Atlantic, Indian and Pacific Oceans after the victory in the Battle of Trafalgar, which lasted for more than half a century. The second level of control over the oceans also comes from global maritime powers, such as Portugal's control of the Indian Ocean in the first half of the 16th century. And control over parts of the ocean can only be exercised by countries that have maritime superiority in that region. For example, from the end of the Russo-Japanese War to the outbreak of the Pacific War, the Japanese Navy's maritime superiority in the western Pacific, and the U.S. Navy's maritime superiority in the Eastern Pacific since the end of the Spanish-American War, were part of the control of the Pacific; 5.Ocean sea power behaves differently in peacetime and wartime. In peacetime, it means that a country's maritime forces in a certain ocean region have a clear lead in terms of base allocation, military size, strike capability, and maritime deterrence, and in wartime, it is manifested in the sea supremacy possessed by a country's maritime forces in a certain ocean area.
The maintenance of ocean sea power requires the possession of maritime forces suitable for controlling the ocean area, supported by corresponding overseas bases. In the Age of Sail, the battle fleet consisting of the ship of the line was the dominant force in the wartime struggle with the enemy for sea supremacy in the oceans. At the end of the Seven Years' War, the strength of the British and French fleets in the Indian Ocean was equal, and the final defeat of the French was due to the lack of maintenance and supply bases in the Indian Peninsula. The British team was able to rest at several ports on the east and west coasts of the peninsula. During World War I, the British battlefleet blockaded the German High Seas Fleet in the waters off the east coast of the North Sea, and a small number of German fast cruisers scattered in other waters around the world, except for the "Goeben" and "Breslau", which were lucky enough to escape into the Dardanelles Strait, sail into the Black Sea, and join the Turkish Navy, the other armored cruisers or light cruisers were successively sunk or captured by the Allied navies. After that, Britain's control of the oceans relied on fast cruisers and a large number of modified artillery-carrying ocean-going liners. Their main task is no longer to fight in the open oceans, but to impose a naval blockade against the Central Powers such as Germany, Austria-Hungary, and Turkey in the global region, especially in the Atlantic Ocean and its coastal waters. Among them, the British Navy and British armed merchant ships intercepted and searched for "contraband" on American merchant ships, which seriously deteriorated Anglo-US relations. It was not until early 1917, when Germany resumed unrestricted submarine warfare, forcing the United States to declare war on Germany, that the maritime contradictions between the two countries were temporarily eased. Ten years after the end of World War I, the British maintained a leading position in the struggle for sea power in the oceans, thanks to their superiority in the number of cruisers and armed merchant ships, as well as their global network of bases. After the signing of the "Washington Treaty," Britain and the United States fought openly and covertly over the number of cruisers to be built, the tonnage of cruisers, and the caliber of the guns on board. Since the United States did not enjoy the right to establish a naval base in the Pacific waters west of Hawaii in the Washington Treaty, it insisted on building more 10,000-ton cruisers with high endurance and 10 cm guns, while the British Admiralty advocated a naval base of less than 8,000 tons and 6There are no restrictions on cruisers with 5 cm caliber guns, and at the same time it is forbidden to continue the construction of cruisers of the 10,000-ton class, favored by the Americans. Its purpose is nothing more than an attempt to maintain its superiority in the ocean through the limitations of the treaty.
As far as the specific form of ocean sea power is concerned, the network layout of mainland and island bases, as well as the actual combat deployment of relatively large-scale naval and air forces at these bases, is the key to ocean control. These bases need to be evenly distributed, form reasonable intervals with each other, echo each other from afar, and rely on each other to realize the deployment of naval and air forces in different regions, at different levels, and in different functions. In this way, it can not only form a north-south island chain control, block the coastal countries in the island chain, track, monitor and deter the ships and aircraft of the hostile countries, but also form a leapfrog springboard in the east-west direction to provide support for the transoceanic operations of the country's maritime forces.
2.Sea rights of shipping routes
Lane sea power refers to the control of an entire sea line of communication, which can ensure that the route is used by the enemy in wartime and at the same time block the enemy's military and commercial shipping.
Compared to land, the sea is vast and extensive, and ships seem to be able to maneuver freely and freely choose the specific route to their destination. But that's not the case. In order to save time, fuel and other costs, maritime transport always chooses the shortest possible route suitable for ships, i.e. internationally recognized commercial routes. The spatial distribution and specific morphology of continental coastlines, peninsulas and islands are the tectonic conditions and constraints of sea routes. The narrow sea between the mainland, peninsulas and islands is often a must for commercial routes. The maritime forces of all parties are mainly deployed for these commercial routes, especially the important narrow sea areas. To defend one's own commercial routes is to defend one's own sea lines of communication. To be able to successfully do this in times of war is to have sea control of shipping routes.
There are usually three forms of sea power. When its starting and ending points are within the same marginal sea area, it actually belongs to a specific type of regional sea power; When it crosses the east and west shores of an ocean, the main part of it is included in the scope of ocean sea power, because only a country that can control a certain ocean has the ability to ensure the safety of its own transoceanic sea lines of communication in wartime; Only the third form is unique to the sea power of the route, that is, the start and end of the route involve multiple marginal sea areas, and may also include part of the oceanic area. For example, the route from Qingdao Port in China to Chittagong Port in Bangladesh covers six sea areas: the Yellow Sea, the East China Sea, the South China Sea, the Strait of Malacca, the Andaman Sea and the Bay of Bengal. Although the route is always close to the mainland and far from the deep waters of the ocean, it crosses the two major water systems of the Pacific Ocean and the Indian Ocean, and passes through the strategically important Strait of Malacca, so that in times of war, this type of sea power is second only to the ocean sea power in terms of security difficulty.
3.Regional sea power
Regional sea power refers to the control of a specific relatively complete and independent ocean area.
Located on the edge of the ocean, surrounded by oceans, straits, bays, islands or continental coastlines, a relatively independent sea area may be formed. It is generally large in area, usually including the offshore waters, contiguous zones and exclusive economic zones of multiple countries, and there are generally multiple narrow sea lanes in the sea area, and may also contain multiple marginal seas and inland seas with small areas. The sea power of such an area is the regional sea power. The Baltic Sea, the Black Sea, the Mediterranean, the South China Sea and the Gulf of Mexico are all regional sea rights.
Regional sea power may be simple and clear, and completely owned by a certain country in the region, such as the Caribbean Sea and the Gulf of Mexico, which are two interconnected sea areas, which are completely controlled by the United States; Most of the Sea of Okhotsk is owned by Russia; It can also be complex and ambiguous, with the sea power of different countries in the region intertwined and contradictory, making it difficult to completely distinguish between the scope of their control and the ability to accurately assess their control capabilities. For example, in the eastern Mediterranean, Turkey, Israel, Egypt, Greece and other countries have strong military strength, and France, Russia and other countries also have military influence in this sea area. Complex types of regional maritime power are most likely to form maritime power conflicts between countries because they involve the coastal waters and territorial waters of many countries, the maritime strength of different countries or groups of countries is relatively close, and there are complex sovereignty disputes.
4.Passage sea power
Access sea power is the control of an important maritime transport hub or narrow waterway.
More than two-thirds of the Earth's surface is covered by oceans. However, in the area near the edge of the continent, especially in the western Pacific Ocean, the European waters of the North Atlantic, the Caribbean Sea, the Mediterranean Sea and other regions, there are large and small peninsulas and islands scattered all over the world, forming a number of narrow straits and sea areas. Some of them are busy sea traffic arteries, and once closed, it will be difficult for ships to choose other routes to detour. The artificially dug Suez Canal and Panama Canal are also arteries for maritime communication. The control of these narrow waterways by a country is equivalent to the establishment of huge gates and gates in these places, which can be used to deter ships of certain countries in peacetime and prohibit passage or seizure in wartime. In February 1986, Ronald Reagan announced at a press conference that the United States would consider closing 16 sea choke points around the world in wartime. The vast majority of these are narrow sea lanes, such as the Korean Strait, the Strait of Malacca, the Strait of Hormuz, the Suez Canal and the Strait of Gibraltar.
Passage sea power has always been a type of sea power that global maritime powers attach great importance to, focus on controlling or exerting military influence. Maintaining maritime rights in the sea requires maintaining the necessary military presence in the vicinity of heavily trafficked straits, bays or canals, as well as maintaining strong political and military relations with the owning or coastal states of these sea lanes. It is worth noting that some countries adjacent to or holding important sea lanes, although they do not have strong navies, it is possible to block sea lanes in wartime simply by stationing heavy troops at key coastal positions, deploying heavy **, and laying mines. The Turkish army's control of the Dardanelles during World War I is a case in point. On March 18, 1915, the combined Anglo-French fleet attacking the Dardanelles sailed into a Turkish minefield less than 10 kilometers from the narrowest point of the strait. The French battleship Bouvet struck a mine and quickly capsized and sank two minutes later, killing more than 600 people. More than two hours later, the British battleships Inflexible and Irresistible also struck mines. That night, the British battleship "Ocean", which came to tow the "Invincible", also triggered mines in the same minefield, and both ** sank to the bottom of the sea during the night. The catastrophe ended the battle in the Dardanelles, and the Turkish defenders, who were on the verge of collapse, finally held the strait. This battle highlighted the special difficulties that an attacker with maritime superiority could encounter in a narrow sea battle against a defender who occupied a key position. Today, Yemen's Houthis remain in the face of high-intensity precision strikes by the U.S. and British navies.
With drones and land-based missiles, they can continue to disrupt commercial shipping in the Red Sea, apparently by virtue of their proximity to the narrow sea.
5.Sea power in the open sea
The far sea power refers to a certain degree of control over a specific area of the far sea that a country has over far from its homeland. The far sea power is different from the offshore sea power, although it is also defensive in nature, but it is often used to define and describe the sea power of countries whose sea power is on the rise.
The so-called 'open sea' mainly refers to the marginal sea, intercontinental sea or ocean area beyond the coastal waters of a country. The concepts of "far sea" and "near sea" were first introduced in the Soviet naval circles in the late 40s of the last century by the Soviet Admiral Vladimir Alafuzov. Faced with the superior sea power of the United States, Alafutsov divided the Soviet Navy's maritime defense into three zones: the open-ocean zone, the far zone, and the near zone. According to Alafutsov, the difficulty of control in these three areas is different. In the near sea zone (within 100 nautical miles of the coastline), continuous control is achieved with the help of shore-based fighters and light torpedo boats; In the far sea zone (up to a few hundred nautical miles from the coastline), if there are nearby sea bases to rely on, with small and medium-sized warships, bombers and torpedo planes, the Soviet Navy is expected to confront a more powerful enemy fleet in wartime, keep the sea control in this area "disputed", and prevent the enemy from carrying out the intention of sea invasion; However, in the ocean region beyond the combat radius of land-based aircraft, because there is no air protection from aircraft carriers and carrier-based aircraft, large surface warships cannot be dispatched, and they can only rely on submarines to carry out limited attacks and harassment on the enemy's sea lines of communication and surface ships, and cannot establish and maintain sea supremacy in any sense.
For China, most of the sea area outside the first island chain and within the second island chain can be called "open sea". The marginal sea areas of other oceans far off the coast of China are, as far as the Chinese Navy is concerned, also belong to the far sea. For example, the waters where the Chinese navy's supply base in Djibouti, East Africa, the waters of the Gulf of Aden, where the Chinese navy conducts anti-piracy missions all year round, and the Strait of Malacca, which is connected to the South China Sea, are all far seas for China. Of course, for other countries, the near sea and the far sea are also relative.
Offshore sea rights are a degree of control over a country's farther sea areas beyond its coastal areas. Because of the distance between the open sea and its own country, it is often much more difficult for a State to control its offshore zone than it is to control its near sea zone.
6.Offshore sea rights
The near sea power is a degree of control that a coastal state has over its offshore area.
Like "offshore water", "offshore water" is not a concept with uniform quantitative standards. It generally refers to an area of the ocean that extends outward for a certain distance from the outer boundary of a country's territorial sea. After the promulgation of the United Nations Convention on the Law of the Sea, the exclusive economic zone within 200 nautical miles of the coastline was considered by many countries to be their offshore zone. Other countries, as in China, consider their entire borderline of the bordered sea to be their offshore. As early as 1985, the then commander of the Chinese Navy said: "In the past, the Navy regarded the sea area within 200 nautical miles of our coast as 'offshore water'. I stress the need to follow Comrade Xiaoping's instructions to unify our understanding of the concept of 'offshore waters.' The 'inshore sea' is China's Yellow Sea, East China Sea, South China Sea, Nansha Islands, Taiwan and Okinawa Island Chain and the waters inside and outside the Okinawa Island chain, as well as the waters of the northern Pacific Ocean. According to this understanding, the coastal waters under the Chinese Navy's vision mainly cover the waters within the first island chain in the western Pacific, and also include some adjacent waters along the outer edge of the first island chain.
In general, offshore sea rights are of vital strategic importance to a country's maritime security. Especially when the contiguous zones or exclusive economic zones of multiple countries partially overlap, disputes over national sovereignty or jurisdiction, as well as confrontation or even armed conflict between the maritime forces of the two countries, are more likely to arise. Extraterritorial maritime powers may also join the equation, complicating the ownership of sea rights in the area.
7.Island sea power
Island sea power refers to the deterrence and control role played by a country in the waters around the islands by virtue of its naval and air forces deployed on island bases.
In general, the farther an island base is from its shores, the more strategically important it is to its maritime power, and the more irreplaceable it is to replace the value of its forward presence, ocean-going or ocean-going deterrence. In particular, islands located on the edge of the ocean or in the middle of the ocean, close to important transoceanic shipping routes, may be an ideal location for a country to deploy its naval and air forces to protect the safety of its commercial shipping, to monitor passing civilian vessels of other countries, and to conduct reconnaissance, surveillance and deterrence of the maritime forces of potential adversaries.
The existence or absence of sea rights on islands, as well as their actual ability to control the surrounding waters, are related to a number of factors. For example, whether the natural conditions of a single island itself, including its area, topography, climate, vegetation, water sources, and coastal morphology, are suitable for setting up large-scale bases, whether there are ideal anchorages for the fleet to station, and whether there is logistical support capability in wartime; whether islands can rely on each other to form an integrated defence, operational and logistical support network; whether the naval and air forces stationed at the island bases will be able to exercise effective control over the surrounding waters in wartime, etc.
In times of war, the ownership of the sea power of the islands has often become the core goal of the phased operations and even the decisive battles of the fleets between the two sides. In the Pacific War, the Battle of the Coral Sea, the Battle of Midway, and the Battle of Guadalcanal all revolved around the defense of key islands or island bases by the U.S. military. When the Japanese army failed in the battle on Guadalcanal, it was already seriously injured and had to switch from attack to defense. Since then, the US Navy has carried out a series of island-hopping offensive operations in the Central Pacific Ocean to deprive Japan of its island sea rights. When the Japanese-occupied islands were completely surrounded, and the Japanese naval and air forces on the islands were completely destroyed, leaving only the army soldiers cowering in pillboxes, trenches, and tunnels, there was virtually no sea power.
At all. In August 1943, the Allied Joint Chiefs of Staff met in Quebec and decided to accept General Ernest Joseph King's suggestion to isolate Rabaul, with 100,000 Japanese defenders, rather than occupy it. Since then, the U.S. navy, carrier-based aviation, and land-based aviation have continued to carry out naval artillery bombardment and air strikes against Rabaul, and have successively conquered other islands occupied by the Japanese army around Rabaul, forcing the Japanese to withdraw all the remaining ** and carrier-based aircraft from the island. By March of the following year, the siege of Rabaul was completed, and although the Allies did not directly attack the island and carried out an amphibious landing, the Japanese troops trapped in the fortress of Rabaul had completely lost their ability to deter and attack the surrounding waters.
8.Territorial sea rights
Territorial sea power refers to the control of the sea area adjacent to the coast or internal waters of the coastal state within the sovereignty of the coastal state.
According to the 1982 United Nations Convention on the Law of the Sea, the width of a country's territorial sea should not exceed 12 nautical miles. The width of the territorial sea varies from country to country, with Norway and Finland being 4 nautical miles, Turkey and Greece being 6 nautical miles, and most countries in the world, such as China, Russia, the United Kingdom, France, and India, being 12 nautical miles. A small number of countries have established a width of territorial waters of more than 12 nautical miles, which has no basis in international law. Because the area within 12 nautical miles of the coastline is within the strike range of shore artillery and land-based combat aircraft, it is relatively difficult to control, so even countries with limited naval strength generally have a greater degree of control over their territorial waters. In such a case, the country's sovereignty over its territorial sea overlaps with its territorial sea rights.
The territorial sea rights are characterized by a high degree of protection under international law. In peacetime, even if a coastal country has a weak navy or even no navy, it is not easy for other countries to challenge its territorial sea rights due to geopolitical, external, and other considerations. But this is not the case in wartime, where the maintenance of territorial sea power can only be achieved by military might.
The order of the above eight types of sea power roughly reflects the order of difficulty in controlling sea power, that is, ocean sea power is the most difficult to control, and territorial sea power is the easiest to control. Among them, territorial sea and coastal sea rights are particularly important to a country's maritime security, and when a country faces security threats from the sea, the country usually puts the maintenance of these two sea rights, especially territorial sea rights, in the first place. Historically, Britain has always deployed its largest fleet near its home soil, even during the period when its maritime power was at its highest. For a coastal state, whether and to what extent it can enjoy other types of sea power is the measure of the country's naval strength and sea power. The specific ownership and distribution of the above-mentioned eight types of sea power in the sea power system actually form differences in the level of sea power of different countries.