It is an eternal iron law for any army to obey orders and obey commands, and our People's Liberation Army is no exception.
However, in the autumn of 1962, when the self-defense counterattack against India was about to begin, the front-line troops of the People's Liberation Army raised objections to the combat plan formulated by their superiors.
Instead of destroying a battalion of the enemy, it is better to destroy one of its brigades! ”
This objection was raised by Liu Guangtong, commander of the 115th Regiment under the jurisdiction of the "Tibetan 419 Unit" of the Chinese People's Liberation Army.
And it was the General Staff of the Chinese People's Liberation Army that formulated the plan of "annihilating one battalion of the enemy."
Old** Mighty and majestic PLA border guards.
Liu Guangtong was nothing more than a regimental commander of a frontier defense unit, and he actually "challenged" the Supreme Command of the whole army and asked the General Staff Department to adjust the plan of the combat troops.
The first to receive the report from Regiment Commander Liu Guangtong was Yin Fatang, the political commissar of the "Tibetan 419th Unit".
The Tibetan character Unit 419 is little known because it only existed for a year.
"Tibetan Unit 419" was originally the code name of the advance command of the ** Military Region, which was established in June 1962.
At that time, the ** Military Region had only three field regiments, and the "Tibetan 419 Unit" commanded these three regiments to deal with the armed conflict on the Sino-Indian border.
Later, the headquarters and the troops under its jurisdiction were integrated into a division and participated in the self-defense counterattack operation on the Sino-Indian border.
At that time, the original combat mission of the 115th Regiment was: to annihilate the Indian army in the Karong stronghold, and then concentrate its forces to remove the strongholds such as guns, pulling out the winter, and wool not losing it.
However, the commander of the 115th regiment, Liu Guangtong, who had rich combat experience, found a problem.
The distance between the Karon stronghold and the stronghold of Gun, etc., and the stronghold of Tuodong is very close.
According to the battle plan, the 115th Regiment would first attack the stronghold of Karon, where a battalion of the Indian Army was stationed.
Liu Guangtong thought that once the battle began, the Indian troops in the strongholds such as Guns and Shodong would inevitably attack, and the scale of the battle would be expanded as a result.
In addition, there is another possibility:
When our troops stormed a battalion of the Indian army, it was very likely that the Indian troops in other strongholds would take the opportunity to escape.
The first scenario is obviously unfavorable to our army, and once the second scenario occurs, the purpose of our army's campaign will also be greatly reduced.
Therefore, the head of Liu Guangtong proposed to the political commissar of the Yin Law Tang:
Instead of hitting a battalion of the enemy, it is better to fight a brigade of him, a battalion is also a fight, and a brigade is also a fight!
Commander Zhang Guohua.
The political commissar of Yin Fa Tang listened carefully and approved Liu Guangtong's idea, and immediately made a report to Zhang Guohua, commander of the ** Military Region and commander-in-chief of the Eastern Front.
After careful investigation, Commander Zhang Guohua resolutely reported to the General Staff Committee that the operational plan of "annihilating one battalion first" should be adjusted and changed to annihilate the 7th Brigade of the Indian Army's ace stationed in the Kejielang area.
However, although he recognized the analysis of the enemy situation in Zhang Guohua's report, he rejected his suggestion to "adjust the battle plan."
What's going on?
It turned out that there was a reason why the General Staff made the operational plan of "annihilating one battalion of the enemy first."
First of all, although the war of self-defense and counterattack against India was a small-scale battle, it was a matter of national and military prestige.
* The Central Military Commission clearly instructed: "In order to win the first battle, we can only fight well, not break it."
Not only did the chairman and the prime minister personally plan, but also the veteran commanders such as ** also participated in the decision-making and command of this battle.
Old** confrontation.
It can be seen from this that the first battle must be won is extremely important, therefore, the high command unanimously believes that for the sake of prudence, the "opening" of the war should not be too large.
Second, the veteran commanders also took into account the war environment and operational conditions.
Since the battlefield was chosen in the foothills of the Himalayas, the harsh environment of the plateau brought great difficulties to the PLA's logistical supply.
However, the Indian army has an advantage in this regard, and they have long been ready for work and have prepared war materials and other aspects.
Thirdly, our army has never fought with the Indian army, and there is a lack of understanding of the combat effectiveness of the Indian army.
However, our army has heard of the 4th Division of the Indian Army, which is stationed in the Kejielang area.
During World War II, the 4th Division of the Indian Army was a strong force under the command of British Field Marshal Montgomery.
During the European war, the 4th Division earned the nickname "Red Eagle" for its meritorious service.
The immediate enemy of our army in this battle was the 4th Infantry Brigade of the 7th Division of the Indian Army.
The 7th Brigade has three infantry battalions and a rifle wing – the famous Gurkha Rifle Wing, in addition to the Rajput and Punjab battalions, which are also elite units of the Indian army.
Old** confrontation.
In view of this, the veterans believe that the appetite of our front-line troops should not be too great.
They are worried that once our army fails to win a quick victory and the war becomes a state of anxiety, the overall operational objective will be greatly reduced, and it may even cause a bad international impact.
It was under the guidance of this ideology that the General Staff Headquarters drew up an operational plan of "destroying one battalion of the enemy first."
However, when Zhang Guohua's most daring battle plan was reported to the chairman, the situation was reversed.
The chairman not only supported Zhang Guohua's operational plan, but also emboldened the officers and men of the unit: "Let them fight, if they don't fight well, they can do it again!" ”
In the early morning of October 20, 1962, the first battle of the self-defense counterattack against India - the Battle of Kejielang began.
Under the cover of night, the PLA troops on the Eastern Front under the command of Zhang Guohua began to operate, and the commanders and fighters launched a fierce attack on the strongholds of the 7th Brigade of the Indian Army at the same time.
In all fairness, the reason why the 7th Brigade of the Indian Army has been able to become India's ace brigade is that there are still "two brushes".
Regarding this point, Yin Fa Tanghui, political commissar of the 419th Tibetan unit, said: "Realistically speaking, the Seventh Brigade of the Indian Army is still very capable of fighting, especially defending the bunker and fighting to the death. ”
In the case of the Karong stronghold, there were a total of 143 Indian troops holding the stronghold at that time, and in the end, except for 51 wounded soldiers who became prisoners of the PLA because they lost their combat capability, the rest of the soldiers resisted stubbornly until they died in battle.
Despite this, in front of the heroic Chinese People's Liberation Army, the 7th Brigade of the Indian Army was unsurprisingly crushed by the People's Liberation Army.
Commander Zhang Guohua commanded operations at the front.
It took less than a day for the PLA's "Tibetan Unit 419" to completely annihilate the 7th Infantry Brigade of the Indian Army, which was known as "invincible in fighting all over Europe and Asia."
Brigadier General Dalvi, the brigade commander of this "ace brigade", first escaped by chance, and later, when he led the remnants over the Hadong Mountain at an altitude of 18,500 feet, he once again fell into the net of the PLA.
In the end, Brigadier General Dalvi had no choice but to become a prisoner of the PLA.
At this point, the Battle of Kejielang ended with the total annihilation of the 7th Brigade of the Indian Army by our army.
The victory in the Battle of Kejielang laid a good foundation for the PLA to finally win the war of self-defense and counterattack against India.
In May 1965, the "Tibetan 419 Unit" was reorganized into the 52nd Division of the Chinese People's Liberation Army.
In August 1969, the 52nd Division of the Chinese People's Liberation Army was transferred to Leshan City, Sichuan Province, and reorganized into the 149th Division of the Chinese People's Liberation Army.
Today, this hero's unit is part of the Western Theater of the Chinese People's Liberation Army.
Regiment Commander Liu Guangtong, who was the first to propose the adjustment of the General Staff Combat Plan, became famous in World War I, and later successively served as chief of staff of the "Tibetan 419 Unit," deputy division commander and division commander of the 149th Division, chief of staff and deputy commander of the 50th Army, deputy chief of staff of the Chengdu Military Region, and adviser to the headquarters.
The old ** general triumphed.
In 1979, when our army launched a self-defense counterattack against Vietnam, Liu Guangtong, as the acting commander of the 50th Army of the Chinese People's Liberation Army, led his troops to the front again.
In the Sapa area of Hoang Lien Province, Liu Quang Tong personally led the 149th Division and launched a "one-on-one" decisive battle with the 316A Division, the ace of the Vietnamese army.
After ten days of fierce fighting, our 149th Division suffered heavy losses and defeated the 316A Division, the ace of the Vietnamese army, and in this battle, the 149th Division destroyed a total of 2,338 enemies.
It is said that when commenting after the war, the leaders of the Central Military Commission boasted that the 55th Army at the army level fought the best, and the 149th Division at the division level fought the most beautifully.
Therefore, the 79 war against Vietnam had the saying that "there are 55 in the east and 149 in the west".
On January 14, 1992, General Liu Guangtong died of illness in Chengdu.
On February 20, 1972, Zhang Guohua, then the first secretary of the Sichuan Provincial Committee of the Communist Party of China, suffered a heart attack, and died at the age of 58.