If you spend about 300,000 yuan to buy an SUV with a length of more than 5 meters, does it mean that you have reached the ceiling of ordinary family car purchases?
In the era of gasoline vehicles, which are dominated by joint venture brands, this view is basically valid. Because of the strict brand and model level, the cost of upgrading the consumption of 300,000 yuan 5-meter SUV has become extremely huge.
Therefore, the joint venture flagship SUV market came into being.
Whether it is the Highlander that has developed the joint venture flagship SUV market, or the Tourang, which has pushed the joint venture flagship SUV market to the top, they have all been the most sought-after price increase models in the market. Because this kind of model, in terms of brand power, product power, functionality, and cost-effective balance, has achieved the apex of the fuel vehicle era.
However, from the listing of Tourang in 2017 to the rapid rise of various new energy vehicles in China after 2021, in just four or five years, the product barriers of the joint venture flagship SUV have suffered a serious impact. Although after 2022, there are still models such as Volkswagen Range Patrol and Nissan Tanlu entering the market, it is undeniable that the popularity of the entire market is not as hot as before, and terminal discounts have long become the norm in the market.
So, is there a chance for further expansion in the joint venture flagship SUV market?
There is no very clear definition of the joint venture flagship SUV. Here, we have selected the highest-level domestic SUVs among the top eight joint venture brands in terms of sales in 2023 and discussed their sales volumes.
They are Touron, Touron X, Lanjing, Lancun (Volkswagen), Highlander, Crown Land (Toyota), Crown Road, UR-V (Honda), Loulan (Nissan), Encore Qi (Buick), Shengda (Hyundai), Explorer (Ford), Trailblazer (Chevrolet).
In today's ** atmosphere, many people may feel that the sales of these 13 joint venture flagship SUVs have plummeted in the past few years. But if we look at the sales data, we will find that the size of this market is actually relatively stable. In 2021, the joint venture flagship SUV market increased by 12% due to the increment of a number of new models, and in 2022, the joint venture flagship SUV market fell by 7% in line with the general environment5%, and in 2023, although there will be sporadic new car increments, the overall sales volume has remained at a certain volume.
And a big change behind this is that the flagship SUV has changed from a profit cow of the past joint venture brand to a role that takes into account both profit and scale.
In the past, GAC Toyota's dealers may have to take some high-volume but not profitable models in order to get the purchase quota of a Highlander. Under this kind of abnormal supply relationship created by manufacturers, it is almost inevitable for dealers to increase the price of the Highlander that "does not worry about selling" in order to make a profit. The same is true for other joint venture flagship SUVs in the early stages of launch.
However, in the past few years, the volume market has been greatly affected by the joint venture brand. The entry-level models of joint venture brands below 100,000 yuan have almost all been wiped out, and the main family models of 10-200,000 yuan are also declining at an annual decline of 13%. When the base is damaged, the models of the joint venture brand of more than 200,000 yuan can no longer be a "profit cow" in a stable manner.
On the other hand, when the same ** segment begins to appear with a better experience, such as new energy vehicles of independent brands or new forces, or consumers who do not have high requirements for functionality turn to look at luxury cars after price reduction, no matter who the joint venture flagship SUV is, there is no longer a reason to increase the price.
Under this domestic and external predicament, joint venture flagship SUVs are faced with two choices:
The first option is to open up the discount and exchange price for volume. For the once hot-selling popular models, this road can still have the effect of stopping the fall and stabilizing in the short term, but it does not play a role in those models that have already been penetrated by the terminal. For example, Highlander and Crown Lufang, after the discount was amplified in the second half of last year, the sales volume rebounded slightly, but for models such as Tourang and Angkeqi, which have always had great terminal discounts, there will be no major changes in sales.
The second option is to turn yourself into a value product that is difficult to replace for niche users. For example, the Explorer, the only longitudinal rear-wheel drive platform in the same class and taking into account light off-road, will have a year-on-year sales increase of 32% in 2023, which is not only the joint venture flagship SUV with the fastest year-on-year growth rate except for new models, but also one of the joint venture flagship SUVs with the most "restrained" terminal discounts. The strategy of this type of product is to amplify the product features and tap a group of users with clear personality labels.
But no matter which choice it is, it means that the joint venture flagship SUV is no longer the market that can lie down and make profits, but must support a certain scale. Because when the joint venture brand as a whole converges to the mid-to-high-end market, once the flagship model falls, it is almost equivalent to being completely marginalized in the Chinese market.
A few years ago, in the same ** segment, the joint venture flagship SUV and the luxury SUV were each well, each occupying a piece of the field. But now, the ** segment where the joint venture flagship SUV is located is entering a full-scale melee stage.
We observe the ** segment of 25-400,000 yuan, and the scale of this market has increased from about 2.1 million units in 2020 to 3.63 million units in 2023, with a four-year compound growth rate of 201%, is the most dynamic market in China's auto market in the past few years.
However, when we classify the 25-400,000 yuan ** segment according to mainstream joint venture brands, overseas luxury and imported brands, and independent brands, the four-year compound growth rate of the three major categories of brands is respectively. 5% and 927%γIn other words, the rapid expansion of self-owned brand new energy vehicles is the core of this active market.
From the perspective of general consumption choices, consumers in the range of 25-400,000 yuan prefer traditional luxury brands, followed by high-end new energy vehicles of their own brands, and finally choose the flagship models of joint venture brands. Because in 2023, the share of independent brands in the 25-400,000 yuan segment has surpassed that of mainstream joint venture brands, and the sales growth rate of mainstream joint venture brands in this segment in 2023 is only 15%γ
Therefore, from the perspective of sales volume and share, the flagship SUV of the joint venture brand still has market space, which is about 300,000-400,000 units per year. But at the same time, the population in this market has been basically solidified, and there is not much room for growth, and the demand will not expand proportionally because of the entry of new cars. For example, the all-new model Lancun in 2023 has brought more than 30,000 units to the joint venture flagship SUV market, but the cumulative sales of 13 joint venture flagship SUVs have fallen slightly by 04%γ
Moreover, from the perspective of large-size SUVs launched by independent brands at this level, such as Ideal and Wenjie, the product definition is completely different from that of the joint venture flagship SUV. This means that there is no overlap between the expanding self-owned brand new energy vehicles and the joint venture flagship SUV, and it is likely that the latter crowd is flowing in one direction.
The people who remain in the joint venture flagship SUV market will be more pragmatic. If a joint venture brand still has a large consumer base in small and medium-sized models, then providing a large-size, full-featured flagship SUV and providing an upgrade and purchase option for the stock in the brand system is already the most capturing user of the joint venture flagship SUV.
For example, Nissan Tanlu, which recently started pre-sale, must use a strong replacement policy to communicate with users and retain the people who have upgraded Sylphy as much as possible, which is the only way to open up sales. Otherwise, whether it is competing with Volkswagen and Toyota, which still have a certain premium ability, or going to fight with independent new energy brands such as Wenjie and Ideal, which have a strong appeal to consumer minds, the situation will not be extremely optimistic.
The joint venture flagship SUV is not as precarious as the first rendering, but it is true that there is not much increment to speak of. In today's era, no progress means that the opponent will eat up the share, and as a defensive side, the most important thing for the joint venture flagship SUV to do is to reduce the loss rate of car upgrades, and retain as much of the past consumption base as possible in the case of the continuous erosion of the mainstream household market.
However, this style of play is still based on the gradual and established rules of traditional fuel vehicles. When independent high-end new energy brands begin to use subversive products and unreasonable marketing to continuously refresh the consumer cognition of all ages, the market space left for joint venture flagship SUVs, especially traditional fuel vehicles, will become smaller and smaller.