Tongdao Think Tank 2024-02-16 11:12 Beijing.
According to the Defense Opinion Network on February 12, the Russian missile frigate "Ivanovits" was apparently sunk by a group of Ukrainian unmanned surface boats, which shows that traditional surface warships are outdated.
The vivid and detailed ** of the Ukrainian suicide drone attack shows that the Russian ship was hopelessly defeated by the drone in maneuvering, with little resistance, and was quickly eliminated. ** The last show shows the ship sinking with the bow sticking out of the water.
Missile frigates are not used as units that fight alone, as their small size and small number of self-defense ** make them vulnerable to attack. Ivanovitz's ** was filmed at night, and some parts of the ship are not fully visible, but one wonders why the Russian ship could not engage the unmanned boat with its 76-mm guns and 30-mm close-range ** system guns. Isn't there an additional lookout in Ivanovitz? Did this operation shut down crew operations, contrary to the common practice of other navies in anticipation of threats from small vessels (manned or unmanned)?
The contest between small warships and unmanned boats
The Ivanowitz was already a small warship, but was sunk by a fleet of smaller unmanned boats. This is not a new phenomenon, and the age and lack of preparation of old ships can lead to the vulnerability of such ships to fleet attacks. A good historical example is the sinking of the Japanese heavy cruiser HMS Haguro in May 1945 by five ships of the Royal Navy's 26th destroyer flotilla during Operation Dukedom.
The Haguro was used as a supply ship at the end of World War II, serving the Japanese garrison in the Andaman Islands from its base in Singapore. The Haguro was in poor condition when sailing, and the guns on one of the turrets, damaged in a previous battle, have been removed from the ship, weakening its firepower. Finally, in order to make more space on board to store supplies, its torpedo tubes were removed and some of the main gun ammunition was unloaded. The Haguro was not ready for battle.
According to reports, the Ivanovitz sank after being hit by six drones. Due to the age (commissioned in 1989) and the reported poor combat readiness of other Black Sea ships, such as the cruiser Moskva, which is equipped with anti-missile combat systems and close self-defense**, it is also likely to be in poor condition. Like the Haguro, the Ivanovitz appears to be surrounded by attackers, with damage to its stern, resulting in an inability to maneuver and an easy target. Ivanovitz also appeared alone, without the support of other Russian ships.
Incoming drones were not detected early
In addition to the general material condition and readiness, one wonders why the surface search radar of Ivanovitz did not detect the incoming drone as early as possible. Since the 1980s, the U.S. and other Western navies have deployed additional lookouts and crew-operated ** around ships to identify small targets, particularly wooden boats.
Judging by the **, Ivanovitz did not deploy any additional lookouts or **groups. The ship's 30-mm short-range ** system seems to be capable of engaging unmanned boats, but does not have the speed and quality of fire of these **. When the attacking unmanned boat was located in the stern of the ship, the 30-mm gun stopped firing.
Ivanovitz also operates in a coastal estuary called Lake Donuzlav. Donuzla is also home to the former Ukrainian naval base occupied by Russia in 2014, so it's no surprise that Ukrainians know how to operate there.
How the US Navy improved
The sinking of the Ivanovitz taught the US Navy a lot of lessons. Despite nearly 40 years of preparation for small ship fleets in the Persian Gulf and beyond, the U.S. Navy could still improve its tactics, techniques, and procedures to avoid the same fate for ships:
Battles with unmanned boats can take place where you least expect them, so be prepared accordingly, even in protected waters.
Deploy manned or unmanned aircraft to better observe the battlefield. All types of aviation assets, including small UAVs, can expand the range of action of a ship and can buy time to better defend against drone attacks.
Preparation is important. The Ivanovitz is an older ship, and the sporadic firepower from its 30mm melee ** systems suggests that these systems are not yet fully functional or combat-ready. The maximum readiness of all ship systems is essential for evading and defending against unmanned boat attacks.
Extras** can help. 0.Bursts of fire from 50-caliber machine guns will not stop unmanned boats as much as they do to stop manned speedboat attacks, but all the additional firepower that a ship can gather can be the difference between a successful defense and a sinking. Many of the installed ** systems have a minimum range, and if an unmanned boat intrudes into this range, there are few other options for self-defense.
Vigilance is crucial. Deploy more lookouts and get people ready. Every additional attention to the situation can have an impact on detecting an unmanned boat attack before it gets too close.
During the American Civil War, Union sailors feared the deployment of Confederate "hell machines" such as semi-submersible spard torpedo boats, mines, and submarines. Today's unmanned boats could be the new hell machines of the 21st century. Still, there are ways to deal with such attacks, and there are many lessons that can be learned from battles such as the sinking of the Ivanovitz.
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