A new book redefines the thinking of America's greatest naval theorist, Alfred Thayer Mahan.
Nicholas A. Lambert, The Neptune Factor: Alfred Thayer Mahan and the Concept of Sea Power (Annapolis, U.S. Naval Institute Press), 440 pp., 34$95. (nicholas a. lambert, the neptune factor: alfred thayer mahan and the concept of sea power, (annapolis, u.s. n**al institute press). 440 pp., 34.95.)
The oceans have been battlegrounds since the dawn of humanity. With the early engagement of seafarers, the ocean became vulnerable to attacks by both state and non-state actors. **and later the emergence of the navy, is to deter these lawbreakers and protect the legal**. This ensures the stability of goods and money** and exchange.
In the last two years alone, maritime security issues have demonstrated this. In the Russian-Ukrainian war, the Kyiv Navy sank Russia"Moscow"cruisers and other ships. Recently, a British ** ship arrived in Guyana because Venezuela threatened its neighbors with access to Guyana's offshore oil. In the Red Sea, U.S. and allied naval vessels counter drone attacks, ballistic missile strikes, and unmanned boats that threaten merchant ships. The squadron continues to enter the waters of the Taiwan region and threaten Taiwan. In the wake of America's two longest land wars, and as these events and actions continue to escalate, both the role and importance of the oceans and the public have been reminded.
These events are not isolated. They are part of a general instability that occurs without a force or a partnership of like-minded forces to protect legitimate business, deter egoists and non-state actors, and defeat those who commit violence on the high seas. Naval scientists did not remain silent. Over the years, reports from various think tanks, other organizations, and ** have sounded the alarm about the crisis at sea. Their voices echo those of Alfred Thayer Mahan, the patron saint of modern naval scientists.
In this environment, a timely new book revisits a century-old topic, enlightens readers with previously undiscovered research, and corrects erroneous interpretations. Nicholas Lambert's Neptune Factor: Alfred Thayer Mahan and the Concept of Sea Power. As in his magnum opus, The War Lords and the Gallipoli Disaster, published in 2021, Lambert delves into how economics shaped Mahan's theories, most notably his classic The Impact of Sea Power on History, 1660-1783 (1890). The book had a significant impact on domestic and international policymakers at the turn of the century. Reading Mahan's entire published work and discovering previously buried letters, Lambert resurrected America's first naval scientist in a way that challenged those who revered Mahan.
Lambert's book is a historical work, but strictly speaking, it is not a book about the history of the Navy and its battles. It is a history that explains Mahan's basic principles, which are of an economic nature. Mahan interacted with the leading economists of the time and learned a great deal about naval affairs from them. Lambert noted that Mahan believed in sea power"It is the continuation of the economy through other means", which is in line with the famous aphorism of military strategist Carl von Clausewitz"War is the continuation of policy by other means"In stark contrast.
Lambert argues that Mahan's writings have been the basis for incorrect applied courses in which it is easier to cite his name but not necessarily understand his writings. A person can claim to be a constitutionalist, but he must read not only the Constitution itself, but also the Federalist Papers, which make important comments on the Constitution. Similarly, naval scholars, as well as those who benefit from a strong navy, need to read Mahan's writings. In this case, Lambert can give a comprehensive overview of Mahan's work, some of which have been hidden in the archives.
Lambert makes it clear at the beginning of the book"The role of the Navy is not only through naval warfare, but also by regulating the international ** system to stifle the enemy's commerce"。The economy is at the heart of a strong navy, and combat is only a secondary factor in maintaining or restoring order at sea. Therefore, the purpose of the Navy is not necessarily power projection, and the intended combat operations should not dictate strategy and procurement. In short, Mahan's basic argument is not"Build a larger fleet simply to raise the status of its institutions or out of chest-beating militarism", but rather emphasizing the inextricable link between maritime services and the global economy. The role of the Navy is to strangle the enemy's commerce, not necessarily to destroy the enemy's fleet. This challenged the traditional view of Mahan's thought, which had led to the failure of contemporary strategic visions of the role of the Navy and merchant marine services in supporting national objectives. What can we blame for this misunderstanding?
In the nineteenth century, the United States understood the role of the Navy in advancing economic goals. During the George Washington administration, the United States had no choice but to pay tribute to the Barbary pirates due to the lack of a navy to protect its seas**. Even Andrew Jackson**, known for his land warfare, had his own maritime strategy: expand**, protect commerce, and respond to provocations with naval action only when necessary. The squadron commodore conducts diplomatic activities at various sites around the globe. Theodore Roosevelt not only took Mahan's ideas, but also put them into practice. In fact, Mahan was also very familiar with Roosevelt, so much so that he even rented Roosevelt's villa in Washington during Roosevelt's trip to Cuba to fight the war. Franklin Roosevelt, like his distant cousin, had an understanding of aviation service that was probably unmatched by other **, and he was deeply involved in the preparations for World War II.
Like Admiral Heyman Rickover, Mahan was one of the few officers to have had an impact on policy and the public outside of his wartime experience. Mahan was embraced by the wider public, and his books and articles became a sensation. For example, from 1885 until a month before his death in December 1914, the New York Times mentioned Mahan more than 1,700 times. Despite the interest in Mahan and his work at home and abroad, the Navy's leadership often shied away from his views, and even one admiral said that naval officers should not write books. In all fairness, as readers of the book "The Neptune Factor" will understand, he is no less dismissive of the leadership of the Navy.
Lambert said"The wheels of history have turned in Mahan's favor, and perhaps the Navy should follow suit"。But if the Gospels are correct, no prophet will be revered in his native land. This is the case today, and people are more likely to find Mahan on the desks of Chinese admirals than in the United States. For the past decade, China has been implementing Mahan's ideas. Outside the U.S. Navy, or even within the U.S. Navy, Mahan's ideas may face challenges if they are to take root again. First, Lambert points out Mahan's book"It fell into the hands of readers who were adept at accepting a coherent introduction to certain large armies"。However, Mahan's success depended on whether the public was genuinely willing to read. Unlike their ancestors in the nineteenth century, people today get their news from social** and are distracted by the infinite entertainment options. There are fewer and fewer students reading for pleasure now than they did a few decades ago. Americans, as a whole, are also reading fewer and fewer books. When seats are empty, it is even more difficult to preach the naval gospel.
Secondly, Lambert points out, Mahan"It is intended to illustrate how the US Navy is critical to protecting their fundamental interests"。This is where the challenge of the modern day lies. Neither Lambert nor Mahan was wrong. Still, it's important to recognize that people, individually and collectively, may not be persuaded to do what is in their interest. For example, the harms of smoking and drug addiction are well documented, yet individuals can still seek immediate self-satisfaction against their personal and broader long-term interests.
In the 2000s, when Somali pirates attacked merchant ships indiscriminately, it made sense to respond given the impact on seafarers, shipping companies and insurance companies. However, one admiral told shipping companies that the U.S. Navy has limited capabilities in protecting them. When"Maersk-Alabama"After the hijacking, the situation changed, and the public began to support the Navy's actions. This situation is not new. As The Federalist Papers acknowledges, public policy is driven more by popular passions than by rational deliberation.
So, despite Lambert's tremendous efforts to represent Mahan and restore it to the public, can his reasoning overcome short-sightedness and sensationalism? Somehow, Mahan was able to convey key concepts that both policymakers and the public could understand. He speaks their language. Mahan made the Navy relevant to them, their lives, and made them understand why they should pay for the Navy. Therefore,"Legislators would hold up Mahan's blue pen book and praise his wisdom"。This simple idea is not always easy to convey and in some cases counterproductive. Look at the previous ones in the UK"Boat money"Taxes, which were levied by the British crown on coastal towns and villages for wartime maritime defense. These inhabitants understand this tax because their industries, fishing and commerce, are directly affected by enemy ships. However, this changed in the thirties of the 16th century, when King Charles I began to collect taxes from the interior, and the inhabitants of the interior had less direct knowledge of ships and seas, which led to the English Civil War and the eventual ** of the king.
In many ways, the United States has turned its back on what made it a maritime nation. In the early days of the Republic, it was as common to talk about ocean ** in the halls of Congress as it was in local taverns and in enterprises that benefited from commerce ** or shipbuilding. Sections of the newspaper are devoted to the latest developments, the dangers faced, or important schedules for departure or arrival of vessels. Even the architecture of New England reflected a direct connection to the sea, with widow's walks built on the roofs of houses. Early American literature also had a strong connection to the sea. Giants such as James Finneymore Cooper (former naval officer), Richard Henry Dana, Herman Melville, and Henry Wadsworth Longfellow (his uncle and namesake were killed in the Tripoli War) all had seafaring backgrounds. The coast is dotted with shipyards large and small, creating and sustaining communities that directly employ local residents. Today, there are very few active shipyards left. On the other hand, a Chinese shipyard has more production capacity than all U.S. shipyards combined.
Lambert wrote:"Mahan wrote "The Impact of Sea Power on History" not to achieve national greatness, but to protect the country's prosperity in a dangerous world. If Lambert's assessment is correct, what does this mean for the United States today, its allies, and their respective economies and navies? While the S&P 500 has reached new heights fueled by a handful of companies, the economic challenges facing the U.S. make 2024 very different from Mahan's time, such as $34 trillion in national debt or widening imbalances.
The Neptune Factor is also important in explaining how the ideas behind Mahan's writings evolved, or were substantially revised due to economic necessity. For example, when Mahan was writing articles and writings about the war of 1812, his naval benefactor, Admiral Stephen B. Luce, admonished Mahan to eliminate"In the War of 1812'We defeated the British'of popular illusions"。Mahan wanted to remove from the book the discussion of the actions of single-ship frigates, because their impact on the war was exaggerated. But Mahan learned that exaggeration and patriotic sentiments are more acceptable to politicians and the public, as well as more marketable. This is not to say that Mahan's work is not credible, but it is important to know that they must be understood in the context of the clamor of the time, and in the context of Mahan's own need to ensure the commercial success of his work.
This extraordinarily in-depth book outlines the need to build a properly sized navy to support national goals and economic stability. It could be a new Bible, with a coherent liturgy that the naval apostles were supposed to preach. Perhaps, in *** year, it could even evoke the slogans posted at the Clinton campaign headquarters in 1992 to remind staff, volunteers, and voters, even with sea power"It's economic! A sucker! "However, whether the people will recognize this and act on it will depend on whether the new apostles are willing to convince them.
The National Interest, February 15, 2024, U.S. Naval Academy Faculty Claude Berube