In the early morning of November 28, 1950, a group of "uninvited guests" appeared 13 kilometers south of the Cheongchon River in North Korea.
The procession meandered and marched towards Sansho-ri, a strategic place that the US Eighth Army must pass through on the Western Front.
At this time, as soon as it was dawn, dozens of US planes had already appeared in the air, and the pilots saw thousands of people suddenly appearing on the mountain road.
At about 8:00 a.m. on the 28th, the Samso-ri base in South Korea was "connected to the pot" by the 113th Division of the 38th Army of the Chinese People's Volunteers.
Lieutenant General Walton Walker, then commander of the US 8th Army, was furious, and he sternly questioned the pilots on the reconnaissance mission why they had not reported the danger to Sanshori in a timely manner! The pilot in charge of reconnaissance replied timidly"This group of troops walked on the mountain road in a grand manner, and they were not afraid of our army's reconnaissance.
In addition, they were all Asian faces, so we mistakenly thought they were Syngman Rhee's "allies", so we did not warn the security officers of Sanshori. ”
Such a ridiculous reply made Lieutenant General Walker angry. What he didn't know was that in more than 20 days, he would die in North Korea.
Figure: Lieutenant General Walker, commander of the U.S. Eighth Army.
In November 1950, the Chinese People's Volunteers launched the second campaign of the War to Resist US Aggression and Aid Korea.
In the first battle, the US 8th Army on the Western Front and the Volunteer Army were in close combat, and the two sides had each other's **. On the whole, the American forces suffered more damage, and their main forces withdrew to the south of the Cheongchon River. At this time, the U.S. 10th Army on the Eastern Front, together with the South Korean army, was still continuing to attack the Volunteer Army.
MacArthur, then commander-in-chief of the "United **", stubbornly believedAlthough the Chinese entered the war, they could not change the overall situation of the war. The U.S. military continued to deploy powerful air and armored units to cut off the Volunteer Army from the Korean People's Army.
MacArthur did have the capital of hubris, and the total strength of the "United **" at that time was 55More than 30,000 people. * The equipment, including logistical supplies, is even more incomparable than the Volunteer Army. The commander-in-chief of the Volunteer Army*** decisively allowed the participating troops to hide in the mountains and mountains of northern Korea. Against this background, a second battle broke out between the two sides.
In mid-November 1950, heavy snow suddenly fell in the mountainous areas of northern Korea, and the temperature dropped significantly.
According to the current battlefield situation, the commander-in-chief of the Chinese People's Volunteers *** made arrangements for the second phase of the campaign.
All participating units of the Volunteer Army avoided fighting head-on with the "United **", lured the enemy into depth, and strived to destroy as many enemies as possible in a mobile war.
Mr. Peng's tactical arrangement is similar to "Tian Ji Horse Racing", in which one regiment of the Volunteer Army pins down three regiments of the enemy, and after encircling the enemy, the forces of the three regiments are concentrated to annihilate one regiment of the enemy.
That is, to divide the enemy's advantage under the equal forces, and then concentrate the superior forces to carry out an overwhelming blow to the "joint **".
Can the "United **" obediently let the volunteers divide and surround it?
In the second campaign stage of the War to Resist US Aggression and Aid Korea, ** adopted a frontal defense to attract the enemy, and then carried out a roundabout encirclement of the "joint**" tactical arrangement.
Therefore, the Volunteers will choose the mountainous areas of northern Korea as the main battlefield, taking advantage of the rugged and narrow characteristics of the roads to block the main transportation arteries and cut off the "United **" retreat route.
Figure MacArthur landing in Incheon.
Mr. Peng personally experienced five anti-"encirclement and suppression" during the Red Army, and led the troops to play the best tricks, and the tactic used was this trick to lure the enemy deeper.
As the saying goes, foreign monks are good at chanting.
Even the Kuomintang army was lured by this trick to lead the enemy deep into the nose, not to mention MacArthur, who had always been above the top?
At the same time, the commander-in-chief of *** and ***, who were far away in Beijing, exchanged views.
**In particular, if the Volunteer Army wants to win the second battle, it must pay attention to two locations: Tokugawa and Gunyuri.
The Tokugawa side was particularly important, and the success or failure of combat operations in this area had a direct bearing on the overall situation of the war.
Spreading out the map, Tokugawa is located in the middle of the Myohyang Mountains in northern Korea, with Nyongwon to the east and Monsan to the south, no more than 25 kilometers away from each other.
This terrain resembles the letter "u" and is the gateway to the northern and northwestern regions of Korea.
The Tokugawa area was at the intersection of the "united" eastern and western fronts, separating the U.S. 10th Army on the Eastern Front and the U.S. 8th Army on the Western Front, forming a gap of about 130 kilometers east of Tokugawa.
Once Tokugawa and Gunyuri are stuck, it is equivalent to putting a tight spell on the "United **" and making it a dilemma.
The U.S. military also noted the importance of the Tokugawa and Gunsumi areas, and in the deployment of the U.S. Eighth Army, the defense of the Tokugawa area mainly relied on Syngman Rhee's 7th and 8th Divisions.
Lieutenant General Walker thinksNo matter how weak Syngman Rhee's army was, it would be more than enough for two divisions to be stationed in Tokugawa and Ningyuan.
Against this background, it was pointed out that the Volunteer Army would strive to annihilate at least 7 or 8 regiments of the enemy by mid-December and continue to advance the front line to Pyongyang in the south, which would be conducive to long-term operations in the future.
On November 6, 1950, the second battle of the War to Resist US Aggression and Aid Korea officially began.
In accordance with the original plan, the participating units of the Volunteer Army slowly retreated to the mountainous areas of northern Korea and gradually lured the enemy into depth.
Under the bewilderment of the Volunteer Army, in late November, the "United **" Western Front troops entered the area of Yongsandong, Tokugawa, and Ningyuan.
Figure Commander-in-Chief Peng who returned to Beijing after the end of the War to Resist US Aggression and Aid Korea.
The 1st Marine Division of the Eastern Front entered the Changjin Lake area and met the Ninth Corps of the Volunteer Army on a narrow road, and then the Battle of Changjin Lake broke out.
According to MacArthur's idea, the "United **" would end the Korean War general offensive by Christmas 1950, and the American boys would go home and eat turkey (Christmas Offensive).
On the evening of November 25, 1950, Commander-in-Chief Peng believed that the time was ripe and began to carry out the "joint **" division and encirclement operation.
He immediately ordered the main forces of the 38th, 40th, and 42nd armies of the Volunteer Army, together with friendly troops, to launch a surprise attack on the Tokugawa and Ningyuan areas while the "joint **" foothold was not stable.
For the contention of these two key points, the commander-in-chief hoped that the 38th Army and the 42nd Army of the Volunteer Army would cooperate closely and must take Tokugawa and Ningyuan.
However, the 38th Army of the Volunteer Army led by Liang Xingchu was holding its breath at that time. In the first battle before, the 38th Army failed to successfully complete the combat mission, and Liang Xingchu was scolded by Commander-in-Chief Peng.
This time, Liang Xingchu issued a military order to Commander-in-Chief Peng that the 38th Army would definitely take the task of the Tokugawa region.
** The commander-in-chief agreed that the 38th Army would attack Tokugawa, but they would have to take Sanshori by 8:00 a.m. and 9:00 a.m. on November 28.
Samsho-ri is bordered by the Taedong River to the south, mountains to the north, and the north-south highway from Pyongyang to Valcheon to the west.
The occupation of Sansholi is equivalent to the three divisions of the US Army being dragged by the Volunteers, and it is a "floodgate" to block the US army's southward escape from the direction of the Qingchuan River, and to gain time for the Volunteers to encircle and annihilate the enemy's main force.
Figure The heroic 113th Division of the Volunteer Army.
In addition to the 38th Army, after the 39th Army of the Volunteer Army annihilated the enemy in front of it, it advanced towards the courtyard and cooperated with the 40th Army to encircle and annihilate the invading enemy.
The 42nd Army seized Bukchang-ri and Kochang-ri as originally planned, and continued to attack Pyongyang and Seoul (Seoul) in the direction of Sunchon, in coordination with the Korean People's Army.
After receiving the order, Liang Xingchu did not dare to slack off, and immediately ordered the 112th Division (owed to the 335th Regiment) to advance along the small road to the Yuanchuan area.
The 114th Division seized the Peak of the Rising Days; The 113th Division (owed to the 339th Regiment) quickly penetrated the Sanshori area from the southwest of Tokugawa.
Liang Xingchu's strategic deployment is basically in accordance with the arrangement of the commander-in-chief, in terms of details, Liang Xingchu first let the 114th Division seize the Jiari Peak, so as to put pressure on the US 8th Army.
Otherwise,The 114th and 112th divisions to the left of the 113th Division will lose cover, and the troops will be exposed head-on to the guns of the "United **".
Secondly, the burden of the 113th Division was particularly heavy. This is because our troops have always been good at cutting off the enemy's retreat route and forming an asymmetric advantage of fighting more and fighting less locally.
The 113th Division had to defeat Syngman Rhee's two divisions, take Tokugawa and Ninwon in a short time, and insert them directly into Sansholi.
If the 113th Division can't take the three divisions, it will not only delay the fighters, but also disrupt the strategic deployment formulated by *** and Commander-in-Chief Peng, and the consequences will be very serious.
The 114th Regiment of the 342nd Division was the vanguard, and it fought day and night, 2 kilometers from the Peak Pass of the Upper Day, and engaged the 1st Turkish Brigade.
The Turkish First Brigade has a total of 5,090 people, all equipped with American-style **, with three infantry battalions and one artillery battalion, and its combat effectiveness should not be underestimated.
However, after the Turkish soldiers seized the Peak, they actually roasted a fire on the top of the mountain to keep warm, and the discipline was quite loose.
Wang Pili, political commissar of the 342nd Regiment of the 114th Division of the Volunteer Army, led the 7th Company to feign an attack, and Sun Hongdao, the commander of the 342nd Regiment, led the 8th Company to climb the cliff from the side and complete the double-sided attack.
Officers and soldiers of the 113th Division crossing a mountain road.
In only 20 minutes, it took the pass of Mt. Ri and repelled the 1st Turkish Brigade.
After seizing the Peak, the 114th Division continued to attack, and on the night of November 28, it again broke a reinforced infantry battalion and artillery battalion of the Turkish Brigade at Yang Station on the east side of Wayuan, and its reinforcements were replaced by the 114th Division of the Volunteers.
The pressure instantly came to the side of the 113th Division.
At the same time, the 113th Division crossed the Taedong River from the right flank and interspersed to the south of Tokugawa, completing the encirclement of Syngman Rhee's 7th Division.
At this time, the 7th Division of the ROK Army hurriedly contracted its forces and retreated to the south.
The 113th Division, under the leadership of division Jiang Chao, political commissar Yu Jingshan, and deputy division commander Liu Haiqing, passed through the defensive positions of the 7th and 8th divisions of the ROK army, crossed from Xinpyeong-ri to the Dadong River, defeated the resistance of the 6th division of the ROK army, and arrived at Shari Peak in the south of Tokugawa at 8 o'clock on the morning of the 26th.
At 14 o'clock in the afternoon of the 26th, the 38th Army of the Volunteer Army launched a general attack on the 7th Division of Tokugawa Syngman Rhee. After 1 hour of fierce fighting, the ROK army retreated to the southwest and was again attacked by the 113th Division and friendly forces.
At 19 o'clock that night, more than 5,000 people of Syngman Rhee's 7th Division were mostly annihilated, and 7 American advisers were captured.
On November 27, General Peng urgently ordered the 38th Army to quickly make a detour to the rear of the enemy's main U.S. Army's 9th Army Corps, Yuli and Sansholi, cut off its retreat, and cooperate with the frontal troops.
The 113th Division attacked along Chuanjie-ri and Satun to Suncheon, south of Gunyu-ri, and along the mountain road of Ansan-dong to Samso-ri, cutting off the enemy's retreat.
Xie Fang, chief of staff of the Volunteer Army, directly hit ** directly to the command post of the 113th DivisionOrdered the division Jiang Chao no matter how difficult and ** the road is, the whole division can only move forward, even if there is only one person left, they must occupy Sansholi.
Whether this battle can achieve a big victory, ** and whether Mr. Peng's plan can succeed, all depends on the 113th Division.
The party members and cadres of the whole division must use the party spirit as a guarantee and resolutely complete the task to the letter, and Jiang Chao deeply feels that the task is arduous.
The 113th Division had been fighting fiercely for three days and three nights in a row, and in the process of interspersing, it would be invaded by enemy troops in Tokugawa, Ningyuan, Suncheon, and Yuanchuan.
Once the 113th Division's whereabouts are detected by the enemy, they will face the dilemma of being attacked by the enemy.
However, the people's army under the leadership of the Communist Party defeated one enemy after another and created countless miracles in military history.
Figure The 113th Division of the Volunteer Army trekking through the mountains and snow.
If there is a difficulty, it must be overcome! This is the spirit carried out by all volunteers.
On the evening of November 27, 1950, the 113th Division set off lightly, and in order to confuse the US planes to reconnoitre, the whole division turned off all radio equipment and remained silent.
At this time, the 113th Division was 72 miles away from Sansho5 km.
Division Jiang Chao ordered Liu Haiqing, deputy division commander, to lead the 338th Regiment as the vanguard and take the lead in action and seize the opportunity.
Because the soldiers were extremely tired, in order to prevent them from falling down the mountain, Zhu Yueqing, the commander of the 338th regiment, asked all the regiment commanders to walk in front, and the soldiers in the back grabbed the bullet belts of the soldiers in front and moved forward one after another, exploring the way for the follow-up main force.
The officers and men of the whole division had reached the limit of physical fitness, but none of them suggested resting, and everyone only thought about quickly interspersing into the three institutes to annihilate the enemy as much as possible and reduce the sacrifices.
In this way, the 113th Division desperately went to Sansholi.
In the early days of the War to Resist US Aggression and Aid Korea, the air strike force of the Volunteer Army was weak, and air supremacy was firmly in the hands of the "United Army".
As the sky gradually brightened, the volunteers would soon lose the cover of night.
Shi Jiang Chao was anxious, because there was still a distance from Sansholi.
At this time, Liang Xingchu, Han Xianchu, Xie Fang, including the commander-in-chief of ***, had not received the situation of the 113th Division for several hours, and they were also worried about the situation on the front line.
Figure: Volunteers capture U.S. troops.
According to General Liang Xingchu's recollections, he and General Han Xianchu were in a hurry in the snow, smoking cigarettes one after another.
Dozens of radio stations in the headquarters went all out to call the 113th Division, and if they couldn't find it, they called the 38th Army Military Headquarters, which made Han Xianchu and Liang Xingchu helpless, and the two of them were under a lot of pressure.
The sky was gradually getting brighter, and dozens of US reconnaissance planes were hovering over the head of the 113th Division.
What they don't know is that at this time, the 2nd and 25th Divisions of the US Army, the 1st Turkish Brigade, the 1st US Cavalry Division, and the 1st South Korean Division of the 9th Army of the US Army have been surrounded on three sides, and the entire Western Front battlefield is very chaotic.
On the battlefield of the Eastern Front, the Ninth Corps of the Volunteer Army defeated the 1st Marine Division of the United States and the United States and South Korea in the main force, and the main force surrounded the United States and South Korea forces in Xiajieyuli and Liutanli, and the battle situation was developing according to the plan of Commander-in-Chief Peng.
Whether or not the "joint **" retreat can be blocked depends on whether the 113th Division successfully seizes Sansholi.
After 14 hours of non-stop rapid marching, the 113th Division was only a distance of no more than 20 kilometers from the Syngman Rhee command post in Sansholi.
In order to evade enemy aircraft, the 113th Division had to stop and go, wasting a lot of time. At this rate, it would have been impossible for them to arrive at Sanshori before the allotted time on the morning of November 28.
After thinking about it, Division Commander Jiang Chao immediately ordered all the officers and men of the division to take off their disguises, pretend to be Syngman Rhee's troops, and take the main road.
In this way, the soldiers of the 113th Division took off their camouflage one after another and marched towards Sansholi under the noses of the US reconnaissance plane. (Fiction is real, reality is virtual).
The U.S. pilots had long noticed the 113th Division, but they did not alert Syngman Rhee's troops stationed in Sansholi.
The reason turned out to be that the US pilots felt that the volunteer army was extremely poorly equipped, and even the main combat units at the division and army levels were not equipped with too many trucks, armored vehicles, and other transport vehicles.
Figure 38 Army Commander Liang Xingchu met with the company's pacesetters.
In this case, it is impossible for a large army of volunteers to march in a hurry in the land of white heaven. This group of Chinese generally took advantage of the night, put on camouflage, and moved to a predetermined location.
Therefore, this group of troops with Asian faces should be Syngman Rhee's "friendly army".
What is even more interesting is that the group of US pilots in charge of reconnaissance not only did not give warnings, but also told Syngman Rhee's troops stationed in the three institutes to hurry up and cook some small salted fish and kimchi to entertain "their own family."
After receiving the notice, the logistics department of Syngman Rhee's army, which was stationed in Sansho, really began to cook, preparing kimchi and salted fish.
Finally, at about 8:00 a.m. on November 28, 1950, the 338th Regiment of the 113th Division of the 38th Army of the Volunteer Army took the lead in seizing Sansholi and repelled the security forces of Syngman Rhee.
In this march, the 113th Division ran 145 miles in only 14 hours, setting a world record for infantry marching.
U.S. troops rode in trucks, but had to move along the road. The two-legged volunteers were able to climb mountains and mountains to take shortcuts, but instead walked in front of them.
At this time, Deputy Division Commander Liu Haiqing ordered the communications squad to quickly send a telegram to the military headquarters and the General Headquarters of the Volunteer Army, and report the details to the chief.
After receiving the telegram from the 113th Division, the General Department of the Volunteer Army personally issued an order to the 38th Army"It must be nailed like a steel nail in the Tokugawa, Ninen, and Sanshori areas. ”
The 113th Division, which had just captured Sanshori, found a group of American troops rushing here.
Deputy Division Commander Liu Haiqing ordered all officers and men to immediately prepare for battle.
After fierce fighting until the afternoon, the group of American troops suffered heavy losses, so they had to bypass Sansholi and continue to advance south through Longyuanli.
According to the information, this group of American troops belonged to the 5th Cavalry Regiment, and their mission was to arrive at Shunchuan on the afternoon of November 28, but they were stubbornly blocked by the 113th Division of the Volunteer Army for a day.
Until the early morning of November 29, the 5th Regiment of the US Cavalry had not reached Suncheon.
On November 29, the "United **" of the Western Front began to retreat on all fronts, and the army broke through along the Gunyu-ri and Yuanchuan areas towards the south of Sansho-ri.
The 113th Division was divided into the 337th Regiment, which had already seized Yongwon-ri, west of Sansho-ri, and cut off the enemy's other road from Gunyu-ri to Suncheon.
In order to break through the encirclement, the 2nd Division of the US Army concentrated more than 100 planes to bomb Longyuanli indiscriminately, blowing up the position of our 337th Regiment into a sea of fire.
With improvised fortifications, the 337th Regiment preserved its living forces and nailed the American troops to their positions like steel nails!
Lieutenant General Walker, commander of the US Eighth Army, who had a premonition that the situation was wrong, gave the order at this time, the U.S. 1st Army retreated to the vicinity of Sinanju; The U.S. 9th Army covered the 8th Army and retreated to the Anju area.
The 1st Turkish Brigade and Syngman Rhee's army continued to fight north.
According to Walker's idea, thoughThe "United **" was defeated by the Volunteer Army head-on, and the main force still had the strength to fight. When the 38th and 42nd armies of the Volunteer Army continued to attack forward, the "joint **" could counterattack. (Wei Wei rescues Zhao).
However, Lieutenant General Walker overestimated the combat strength and morale of the "United **" and seriously underestimated the determination of the Volunteer Army to repel the enemy.
In addition, the 113th Division took the lead in seizing Sansho-ri, separating the connection between the US 2nd Division, the 1st Turkish Brigade and the 1st US Cavalry Division on the right flank of the US 8th Army.
Although the 113th Division of the Volunteer Army was attacked by the enemy at this time, the "United **" sent a large number of planes and tanks to launch a fierce attack on the front-line positions of Sansholi and Longyuanli.
However, the roads in the Sanshori area are narrow, and it is difficult for the US military to give full play to the mobility advantage of the large army.
Figure The headquarters of the 113th Division of the Volunteer Army.
Even with air supremacy, the U.S. 8th Army was in a state of division and chaos, resulting in the U.S. 25th Division, the U.S. 1st Cavalry Division, and the remnants of the Turkish 1st Brigade, which had retreated from the Western Front, all stuck in the Sanshori area.
The U.S. troops on the eastern and western fronts only need to advance another 5 kilometers to meet, but they are divided and surrounded by the 113th Division of the Volunteer Army, and it is difficult for them to advance these 5 kilometers further.
In the end, the "United **", which was besieged by the Volunteer Corps, suffered heavy losses, abandoned more than 2,000 vehicles, hundreds of tanks, and thousands of artillery and heavy equipment, and turned to the direction of Anzhou to join the US 1st Army.
At this point, the US 8th Army retreated on all fronts, and the volunteers captured more than 3,000 people just by taking prisoners.
On December 23, 1950, Lieutenant General Walker, then commander-in-chief of the U.S. 8th Army, overturned and died while fleeing.
At the end of 1950, after the end of the second campaign of the War to Resist US Aggression and Aid Korea, the achievements of the 38th Army of the Volunteer Army were commended.
** From the commander personally issued a commendation telegram, he added a sentence "Long live the 38th Army" after "Long live the Chinese People's Volunteers."
The nickname of the "Long Live Army" of the 38th Army of the Volunteer Army has spread since then, and the army commander Liang Xingchu has changed from a "rat general" to a "long live general".