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He Wannan
A-shares fell sharply this week, with more than 5,100 stocks in Shanghai and Shenzhen and only 130 stocks in the Shanghai and Shenzhen stock exchanges, with a ratio of 25%, the major indices have hit a three-year low.
In the author's opinion, it is expected that A-shares fell by more than half this week, and if the root cause of the continuous ** is not found, it will be difficult to change the status quo.
The 2023 annual report forecast disclosed as of January 31 is probably the worst year on record. The previous performance forecast is usually the first open, that is, 6 into the good news, 4 into the bad. Among the 2,790 performance forecasts that have been disclosed so far, only 765 are expected to increase (including a slight increase), accounting for 27%, and even if 306 companies are added to turn around their losses, they account for only 40%. You must know that a considerable part of the loss-making company relies on the sale of assets, and still loses money after deducting non-profits. The number of pre-loss companies reached 768, which is more than the number of companies with pre-performance increases.
Let's look at a few individual cases. Case 1: Holitech (002217) expects a loss of 9 billion yuan to 12 billion yuan, and the equity attributable to the owners of the parent company at the end of the reporting period is -65100 million to -35100 million yuan.
The company only lost 32 percent in the first three quarters of last year900 million yuan, how can there be a huge loss of 12 billion yuan throughout the year? The company said that "in addition to the operating loss of about 2 billion yuan, the inventory price decline provision is about 3.3 billion yuan to 4.3 billion yuan". Inventory at the end of the third quarter was 32900 million yuan, how to withdraw 4.3 billion yuan? "The provision for impairment of long-term assets is about 2.8 billion yuan to 3.8 billion yuan". At the end of the third quarter, the long-term investment was only 2800 million yuan, how to provide 2.8 billion yuan to 3.8 billion yuan? "Due to the assessment of the expected credit loss of financial instruments, the expected credit loss method is used to make provision for bad debts according to the age of accounts receivable without objective evidence of impairment, and the credit impairment loss of receivables is about 1.3 billion yuan." If the expected credit loss of a financial instrument is incomprehensible to borrow money, why should receivables with no evidence of value be accrued?
Holitech's major shareholder was originally a Fujian state-owned asset, because the listed company's debts were overdue, and in March last year, it was announced that it planned to transfer the controlling stake, and it was said that the transfer was **609 yuan shares, it is said that it is still a private enterprise, and the price was only more than 2 yuan at that time. What is the reason why Holitech has become the "thunder king" with a loss of tens of billions today?
Case 2: BAIC Blue Valley (600733) expects a loss of 5.2 billion yuan to 5.7 billion yuan in 2023. The company was listed in 2017 through the backdoor of SS Qianfeng, and has accumulated losses of more than 20 billion yuan in the past four years, except for a slight surplus in the previous two years.
At the end of 2017, the Beijing State-owned Assets Supervision and Administration Commission (SASAC) set its net assets at 1610.9 billion yuan of BAIC New Energy, with a price of 288500 million yuan was injected into listed companies, with an appreciation rate of 7524%, thus forming a high goodwill of 9 billion yuan.
Not only that, on the basis of knowing that there have been huge losses for several years, facing as high as 82The debt ratio of 8% was also approved by BAIC Blue Valley in April last year to 4The private placement of 7 yuan shares raised 6 billion yuan, and now, not only the 35 institutions participating in the additional issuance have entered, but the 6 billion yuan additional issuance has been exchanged for a huge loss of 5.2 billion yuan to 5.7 billion yuan.
This time, the loss was 5.2 billion to 5.7 billion yuan, and the goodwill has not yet "exploded".
Case 3: Hepalink (002399) claimed in 2010 that its product heparin sodium was the only certification of the US FDA, and had created the highest issue price of 148 yuan in the history of A-shares$4.7 billion to $92.5 billion yuan.
Hepalink's major shareholders, Li Li and his wife, who were the new richest people in Chinese mainland with a net worth of 50.4 billion yuan in the year of listing, but such a Kochi couple suffered the largest telecommunications fraud case in the history of A-shares, and it is said that criminals defrauded a subsidiary in Italy by forging the email addresses of company executives, external lawyers and auditors, involving nearly 100 million yuan.
What is the problem with such a cliff-like Hepalink? At the end of the day, there's too much money. At the beginning, the IPO was planned to raise 8600 million yuan, but 5.9 billion yuan was raised, so over-raised, is it not a "drizzle" to be defrauded of 100 million yuan?
Case 4: Ninestar (002180) made a profit of 18 last year6.3 billion yuan, with a loss of 5.5 billion yuan to 6.5 billion yuan by 2023.
You must know that this company also made a profit of 2 in the first three quarters of last year1.2 billion yuan, why did it lose 55 yuan to 6.5 billion yuan at the end of the year? The root cause is also the impairment of goodwill.
In 2016, the company, formerly known as Apex, bought 100 percent of an American company for $2.7 billion (18.9 billion yuan), which made a profit of 61 million yuan that year. It is this "snake swallowing elephant" merger and acquisition that has brought tens of billions of yuan of goodwill to the top, and no impairment has been provided so far.
Now, the goodwill of more than 13 billion yuan has finally exploded! The continuous ** stock price has caused heavy losses to 30,000 to 40,000 shareholders.
Case 5: *ST Doushen (300010) has lost money for 4 consecutive years (3200 million to 3800 million yuan), and the net assets were negative (-7500 million yuan), and it was issued a non-standard opinion. And the company name is constantly changing, and there are no less than dozens of such companies in Shanghai and Shenzhen, just to name a few.
The stubborn disease of A-shares is in**? First, the new shares are issued at a high premium and at a high premium, and the shareholders' money is not used for money; the second is that the major shareholders "dump the pot" or transfer at a high premium, or continuously **, making the market miserable; Third, the company's performance has changed, but speculative funds have been speculated.
For now, these garbage companies must be cleaned out of the a** field. Can we learn from India**, in 2004 alone, 974 companies in India were delisted. In the 22 years from 1996 to 2018, there were 2,869 delisted companies in India, with an average of 106 delisted companies per year, accounting for more than half of the average annual number of IPOs.
Through the strict implementation of the delisting system, India** has not only effectively purified the market, but also provided a better investment environment for investors. In addition, the post-delisting compensation mechanism also further protects the interests of investors and reduces the losses caused by the delisting of enterprises.
Of course, a large number of delistings will usher in labor pain, but if A-shares do not get through this labor pain period, I am afraid that it will be even more painful in the future.
Edit|Chen Yuhe Proofreading|Yuan Gang
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