Commander Su and Chen Geng were both founding generals, but unlike Zhang Yunyi and others among the generals, strictly speaking, they were not the founding figures of the early army. Although Su and Chen both participated in the Nanchang Uprising in 1927, Chen Geng was a grassroots cadre at the level of battalion commander at that time, while Commander Su was only a squad leader, and neither of them was the main leader. During the Nanchang Uprising, Commander Su and Chen Geng did not know each other, and belonged to the teams of General He and General Ye Ting respectively. It wasn't until the later stages of the Liberation War that the two really met for the first time.
Although General Chen Geng is four years older than Commander Su, his personality is very bold, and he has always been very respectful, appreciative, and humbly asked for advice from people with outstanding military talents. In the second phase of the Huaihai Campaign in 1948, the Central Plains Field Army, which was not well manned and poor, although it blocked the 12th Corps of the Kuomintang Huang Wei who tried to reinforce the East China battlefield, but it was very difficult to really take down this elite enemy.
At this time, Commander Su, who had already eliminated Huang Baitao's Seventh Corps in Nianzhuang, introduced a method of tackling tough problems to Nakano's side, that is, soil work. By constantly digging tunnels and slowly approaching the enemy's defense line before launching an attack, the troops can greatly reduce the number of attacking troops, and the attack effect is much better than blindly attacking. Chen Geng's unit was an important combat force in Shuangdui, and after drawing on the experience introduced by Commander Su, the columns of the Central Plains Field Army finally gnawed off the hard bone of Huang Wei's corps under the support of Huaye. Chen Geng, who had already admired Commander Su, was even more impressed now, and he also kept the magic weapon of "soil work" firmly in his heart.
During the War to Resist US Aggression and Aid Korea, Chen Geng served as the commander of the Third Corps of the Volunteer Army in 1951 and arrived at the Korean front. After the end of the five large-scale movement battles, the two armies entered the stage of stalemate, in order to be able to compete with the US army, which had the absolute upper hand in the first equipment, Chen Geng remembered the fighting style recommended by Commander Su during the Huaihai Campaign. With the U.S. military's superior firepower, why can't the same tactics be used again on the Korean battlefield? Therefore, under Chen Geng's argumentation, the Volunteer Army Headquarters decisively agreed to the tunnel operation method, and transferred Wang Yaonan and other engineering elites and technical personnel from China to North Korea to preside over the tunnel excavation.
Sure enough, by using this style of play, the U.S. military had no way to deal with the solid defense line of the volunteers, and the battle line could not be pushed forward for a long time, and the two sides always engaged in military confrontation near the 38th parallel, which lasted until the Korean armistice in 1953. General Chen Geng undoubtedly made great contributions, and although he was later transferred back to China to preside over the construction of Kazakhstan's military industry, the tactics and ideas he left behind have been used in the Korean battlefield. It can be seen that Commander Su has a deep influence on Chen Geng. You must know that Chen Geng is already a genius-level commander in the history of our army, but he thinks that his talent is inferior to Commander Su, and it is not difficult to see that Su Geng is called the "God of War" by the military and the people, and there is no exaggeration at all.
However, due to some contradictions in his work after the founding of the People's Republic of China, Commander Su, who had served as chief of the general staff of the whole army, was criticized by General Peng, Minister of National Defense, Nie Shuai, Huang Kecheng and others, and was accused of extreme individualism at that time. At the enlarged meeting of the Military Commission in 1958, thousands of generals attended the meeting, and under pressure or for other purposes, many people poured dirty water on President Su, and some even pointed out that he actually did not know how to fight, and during the War of Liberation, he lost a lot of troops in the Nanlin Campaign and the Eastern Henan Campaign. This accusation is undoubtedly absurd, because of course, there is no such thing as a victorious general, and although Su Zong's military level is superb, it is unrealistic to win every specific battle. Limited to subjective and objective factors, it is normal to suffer setbacks in individual battles.
Senior General Chen Geng was also present at the time, and he was very unhappy to hear that someone slandered Commander Su like this. He also ignored the atmosphere of the venue at that time, and retorted on the spot: You say that he can't fight, so which one will? Please stand up now, I'd love to see it! Hearing Chen Geng's serious speech, the venue was much quieter for a while, and he did not continue the topic. Chen Geng's military achievements are high and his popularity is good, so no one grasps this sentence to embarrass him. Chen Geng and Mr. Su have a deep friendship and insist on the truth, so they can speak for the criticized people in such a straightforward manner at the venue.
Having said that, Commander Su's argument that "it is not possible to fight" is related to the fact that after Huaye suffered several defeats in 1947, the deputy political commissar of the field army wrote a letter to General Su to give advice. At that time, Deputy Political Commissar Tan affirmed General Su's military genius and pointed out some shortcomings in his command, of course, that letter belonged to Tan's personal opinion. The letter was used by some in 1958 to exaggerate the accusation of Commander Su, which aroused Chen Geng's disgust.