The Battle of Pingjin seemed to be an easy victory, but in fact, the enemy army was strong and required a refined strategic layout and deployment. To solve this problem, ** personally directed the operation to cut the sheeted line.
However, the three major corps in Northeast China and North China that participated in the operation had problems in the implementation of the first army, which made the first army very dissatisfied. So, what exactly happened?
The starting point of the Pingjin Battle caused *** to think deeply, and he found that although Fu Zuoyi's long snake array seemed to be well-defended, it actually had a taboo in the soldiers, especially the flat line of the traffic artery that he was preparing to flee westward.
** It was proposed to capture Zhangjiakou first, cut off the Pingzhang line, and then attack the enemy forces in the Beiping area. He judged that Fu Zuoyi might send his number one main force, the 35th Army, to the rescue, which would be an important opportunity to annihilate the enemy army.
** Skillfully dispatched troops, successfully lured the 35th Army out of Beiping, carried out a powerful attack on the enemy, and finally won the Pingjin Campaign. "
On November 28, 1948, the ** Military Commission issued an order for the operation of the Pingzhang Line, and the participating troops included three corps in Northeast China and North China, with a total of 100,000 people, most of whom were Fu Zuoyi's descendants.
The order demanded to divide, encircle, and eliminate Fu Zuoyi's troops on the Pingzhang line, and then concentrate all efforts to solve the Zhangjiakou defenders, especially to eliminate Fu Zuoyi's 35th Army in Zhangjiakou.
On December 4, 1948, the ** Military Commission fully deployed the battle plan, the Northeast Advance Corps should quickly rush to the Huailai and Nankou lines, the North China 2nd Corps should surround the enemy in Xuanhua and Xiahuayuan, and the North China 3rd Corps should cut off the line from Zhangjiakou to Xuanhua so that the 35th Army could not retreat.
However, just as they were deployed and ready to concentrate their forces to annihilate the enemy, the three corps were on a business trip almost at the same time.
At the end of the Liaoshen Campaign, the main force of Dongye was still outside the pass, and in order to copy Fu Zuoyi's back road, ** decided to send the advance corps led by Cheng Zihua to secretly enter the pass from Xifengkou and Lengkou.
The soldiers of the advance corps marched day and night, and the journey was difficult. When they walked to Miyun, Cheng Zihua realized the importance of Miyun City, because Miyun City controlled the crossings of the Chaohe River and the Baihe River, and if the enemy in Miyun City could not be quickly dealt with, then the equipment carried by the advance corps might not be able to pass smoothly.
In addition, Cheng Zihua also got the news that there were less than 2,000 enemies in Miyun City. Therefore, Cheng Zihua decided to quickly attack Miyun City with the superior strength of our army to ensure the smooth progress of the march.
It turned out that the enemy had four regiments of troops deployed in the city, and our troops spent two days attacking the city from December 3 to December 5. Because the Northeast Advance Corps failed to reach the Pingzhang Line on time during the attack on Miyun, the true identity of the siege troops was revealed, making Fu Zuoyi realize that the Northeast Field Army's attempt to secretly enter the customs had been exposed.
Fu Zuoyi immediately ordered the 35th Army to withdraw to Beiping. The new copy is as follows: When our troops launched an attack on the enemy, we found that the enemy had four regiments of troops deployed in the city.
Although we spent two days besieging the city from December 3 to December 5, the true identity of the besieging force was revealed by the enemy because the Northeast Advance Corps failed to reach the Pingzhang Line on time during the attack on Miyun.
In this way, the attempt of the Northeast Field Army to secretly enter the pass was also detected by the enemy. Faced with this situation, Fu Zuoyi immediately ordered the 35th Army to withdraw to Beiping.
The 2nd Corps in North China was unable to reach the Pingzhang Line on time due to difficulties such as long distances, mountain marches, and river blockages. However, due to an error in judgment, the 3rd Corps of North China failed to completely cut off the connection between Zhangjiakou and Xuanhua on the east side, allowing the enemy to flee eastward.
Despite sending three telegrams in a row, asking them to act quickly, they were ultimately unable to reach the scheduled plan.
From December 3rd to December 6th, the three corps made mistakes in the same time period, which made ** extremely dissatisfied. Prior to this, the words "rapid" and "rushing" had been emphasized, hoping to quickly complete the combat mission.
However, for various reasons, the three corps did not complete their tasks as scheduled, and ** sent harshly worded telegrams to the three commanders respectively. Among them, the telegram to Cheng Zihua mentioned: "You did not retreat Miyun according to the order, but instead went to attack the vanguard army, resulting in a delay.
This situation may cause the 35th Army to flee east with the enemy of Huailai, and you will have nothing to do but run empty. The telegram to the 3rd Corps in North China pointed out: "We have sent you clear telegrams on many occasions, asking you to resolutely cut off Zhang and Xuan and prevent the enemy from meeting in the two places.
If the strength of the first column is insufficient, part of the strength of the second column should be increased, why do you turn a deaf ear? In the end, ** sent a telegram to the 3rd Corps alone, again severely criticizing: "Yang and Li violated the clear orders of the Central Military Commission on many occasions in the past, gave up the task of cutting off Zhang and Xuan contacts without authorization, and allowed the enemy's 35th Army to flee eastward, which is absolutely wrong.
In the future, Yang and Li's task was to encircle the enemy at Zhangjiakou, and they must ensure that they do not allow the enemy to flee to the west, east, or by a detour, and if the enemy escapes, they must be resolutely annihilated.
Yang and Li should strictly order their subordinates to take full responsibility and not make any mistakes. ”
This telegram criticism of the Corps level was very rare throughout the War of Liberation. This shows that the chairman has a high degree of concern and concern about the overall layout of the Pingjin Campaign.
The commanders of all corps took the initiative to assume their responsibilities and made self-criticism to the CMC and the chairman. Lessons learned, the units took immediate action, and made deployment adjustments in accordance with the orders of the Military Commission, and soon regained their morale.
The 2nd Corps in North China successfully surrounded and annihilated the enemy's 35th Army, part of the Northeast Advance Corps and the 3rd Corps in North China liberated Zhangjiakou, Fu Zuoyi's long snake formation was completely disconnected, and the defeat of the Pingjin Campaign was a foregone conclusion.