The biggest defeat of the Sino Vietnamese War from the perspective of the Vietnamese army, the Battl

Mondo Military Updated on 2024-03-05

In the early morning of July 12, 1984, the Second Military Region of the Vietnamese Army moved a reinforced infantry division (4 infantry regiments: 141 regiments of the 312 division, 174 regiments of the 316 division, 149 regiments and 876 regiments of the 356 division; 2 ** battalions: 1 battalion of the 198** regiment and 1 battalion of the 821** regiment), carried out a large-scale campaign counterattack codenamed "MB84" on the 8-kilometer front line of Laoshan in Malipo County, Yunnan Province, China.

The Vietnamese army adopted the tactical means of sneak attack to strengthen the offensive, using the frontal breakthrough, the two flanks containment, and the centripetal attack of the play, in an attempt to first attack the 662 of the battle line6. A breakthrough was reached in the highland area and the Nala area, and then, relying on the vested positions, the Laoshan area, which had been recovered by our army, was seized point by point.

* Fighting from woodland with mountains, due to the terrain restrictions, there are few roads, and when the infantry approaches the front line of the opponent's defense, it cannot be fully deployed due to the terrain, and it is easy to crowd into a group, resulting in a dense formation. The density of troops of the Vietnamese army in such a terrain with a reinforced division-sized unit to attack our frontage of eight kilometers is rare, and the determination of the Second Military Region to try to break our army's position with a sea of men and thus regain the "lost territory" can be seen!

In order to hold its position, smash the Vietnamese army's counterattack attempt, and give full play to the decisive role of artillery, our 14 th Army formed a multi-layered, large-depth, and dense fire network with 16 artillery battalions at and above the division level as the backbone after careful planning. According to the different capabilities of various types of artillery, the Vietnamese army planned firepower on roads, bridges, fork roads, passes, and areas where troops and weapons could be deployed. The 14 Army artillery pointed out that 4 lines of blocking were planned within 4 kilometers of the defensive front. The 40th Division, with divisional and regimental artillery groups and regimental and battalion mortars, set up four blocking lines from far to near.

Fire control networks have been set up in areas convenient for the Vietnamese troops, such as Qingshuikouzi, Hoang Luo, and Nam Ga, to enhance the ability of firepower to respond quickly and accurately. The firing area is divided into regimental and battalion artillery responsible for the front 150-400 meters, regimental artillery groups responsible for 300-800 meters, and divisional artillery groups responsible for targets above 800 meters. This allows our artillery to effectively hit the Vietnamese army at different distances within the range of artillery.

After the night covered the land on July 11, the Vietnamese army began to enter the starting position of the assault. Its deployment was: the 149th Regiment attacked the Laoshan direction, and the 876th and 174th regiments attacked the 662ndIn the direction of the 6th Heights and Nala, the 141st Regiment and the 266th Regiment attacked the direction of Dongshan of the Bali River, and the 198th Regiment and the 821st Regiment each cooperated with the infantry action. At 3 o'clock in the morning of the next day, our army carried out artillery counter-preparations for the possible approach and deployment of the Vietnamese army, and the Vietnamese artillery also responded immediately, and the two sides launched a continuous artillery battle.

At about 5 o'clock in the morning, the Vietnamese infantry launched an assault on our forward positions one after another, but what they did not expect was that they were "greeted" not only by rifle bullets, machine gun bullets, grenades, and mines, but also by shells of various calibers that rained down like raindrops.

The fragments and shock waves generated by the violent ** made the Vietnamese troops attacking on foot have nowhere to hide and have nothing to hide. The intensity and duration of the fierce artillery bombardment of our troops were simply unbearable for the enemy in front of them. The Vietnamese army, which originally planned to make contributions in one go, was heavily affected by the sea of fire, and the corpses were all over the field.

This desperate and tragic scene experienced by the Vietnamese army was immediately reflected in the radio communication to report the battle situation to its superiors

The 3rd Battalion of the 316th Regiment of the 174th Division of the Vietnamese Army, which attacked the direction of Heights No. 149, reported to its superiors that "the formation was hit by artillery fire and lost its combat effectiveness......The troops occupying the 233 heights were ** two-thirds ......When the 9th consecutive hit reached 15, there were only 2 people left."

The 1st Battalion of the 174th Regiment of the 316th Division, which attacked the 142nd Heights (the famous Li Haixin Heights), reported to its superiors that "half of the casualties were lost, many were wounded, the battalion commander "Zhi" was killed in battle, and the deputy battalion commander "Mao", a company commander, and two deputy company commanders were seriously wounded", and asked that troops be sent up to rush up and transport the wounded.

Offensive 662The 6th Regiment of the 356th Division in the direction of the 876th Heights reported to the higher authorities that there were many casualties in the company, and the 3rd Company was reduced to only 20 ......3 battalions**, 284 people were missing, the battalion commander "Qing" was killed, and a total of 105 submachine guns and light machine guns were lost.

Pei Nile, chief of staff of the 313th Division, who commanded the 141st Regiment of the 312th Division to attack the Dongshan direction of the Bali River, reported the battle situation to the front commander of the 2nd Military Region: "When the attack was launched, it suffered heavy artillery fire, the attack was blocked, the troops suffered losses, the commander of the 1st Battalion was killed, the deputy battalion commander was wounded, one part of the troops fled to the woods, and the other ran back to the assembly area, the commander could not control the troops, the 1st Battalion lost more than 80 people, and the 4th Battalion suffered even more miserable ......”

In the 16 hours of fighting on this day, the 14th Army consumed a total of 1261 tons of shells of various calibers. The Vietnamese army's crowd tactics did not survive even a day in the face of our army's sea of fire, so they had to hastily withdraw their troops because of too great losses. The Second Military Region's ambitious and well-planned "MB84" campaign plan ended in a crushing defeat, which was the biggest defeat of the Vietnamese army in the 10-year war against China.

In the summer of 2012, a Vietnamese writer named Pham Thanh Tao (a Vietnamese martyr, his younger brother was a soldier of the 876th Regiment, in 712. Killed in the counterattack) interviewed Le Wei Mi, then commander-in-chief of the Vietnamese army at the front, then deputy commander of the Second Military Region and commander of Ha Giang.

When talking about the Vietnamese army's fighting style, Le Wei Mi said that the squadron has strong strength and strong artillery firepower, but we also have our own way of fighting, that is, we concentrate superior forces, adopt a secret and close fighting style, approach the enemy by surprise and launch an attack, and strive to quickly win the victory in the operation when the squadron has no time to reinforce it.

Li Weimi attributed the failure of the offensive to the heavy artillery fire of the People's Liberation Army, saying: At that time, it was almost dawn, and as soon as we were **, they all opened fire, 27 artillery regiments, and a division artillery group opened fire on us, as well as rocket artillery, so we could not advance. At 4 o'clock in the morning**, until 4 o'clock in the afternoon, it was no longer possible to advance and recapture 1509 (that is, the main peak of the old mountain), so he said to Li Yuxian, we cannot recapture it, the plan may be aborted, and it is recommended that you order the withdrawal of troops. He reported it to his superiors, who said that it was the only way. So at half past four, I gave the order to withdraw the troops.

How many Vietnamese troops were wiped out in this battle? Different sources** have different interpretations, and due to the different statistical calibers, there are considerable discrepancies between some of the data. For example:

The basic summary of the two-mountain operation of the Chengdu Military Region said: More than 2,000 enemies were killed, and the enemy's internal report was more than 3,000. The summary of the Laoshan operation of the 14th Army said: A total of 1,329 enemies were killed and wounded, and 5 enemies were captured. The history of the 14th Army's defense of the frontier said: more than 3,300 enemies were killed and wounded, and 5 enemies were captured. According to the memorabilia of the military work of the Kunming Military Region, more than 1,500 enemies were annihilated and 6 enemies were captured (the enemy reported losses of more than 3,000 people).

According to the principle of self-love and self-reporting, generally speaking, one's own losses are the clearest, and one's own statistics are closest to the real situation. Therefore, in some historical materials of our army, the saying "more than 3,000 people reflected in the enemy" is adopted. As for this internal report from the enemy, since we have not seen any specific information, we do not know where it came from, so it can be inferred that there are only two situations: First, the content of the Vietnamese army's radio communications intercepted by technical reconnaissance, and second, the relevant data provided by the spy personnel we have developed in Vietnam.

Judging from the battlefield situation, the Vietnamese army dispatched 5 infantry regiments and some ** troops, a total of a reinforced division-sized force, to counterattack us, and was seriously killed and wounded by our artillery fire. The large-caliber artillery and the artillery of the regiments and battalions worked closely together to inflict a devastating blow on the Vietnamese army's vital forces with its overwhelming artillery superiority, and completely shocked the enemy mentally and displayed the majesty of the artillery. On many occasions, the enemy who attacked our forward positions was repulsed by artillery fire before they could exchange fire with our infantry, which greatly reduced the pressure on the infantry and played a decisive role in supporting the infantry to hold their positions, and the number of enemy troops destroyed by artillery fire accounted for more than 60 percent of the total number of enemies destroyed.

Moreover, the targets of our artillery fire were not only the Vietnamese troops who were attacking our forward positions and the Vietnamese troops who were waiting to deploy, but also the targets of the assembled infantry and artillery positions located in their depth. A total of 1,261 tons of artillery shells were consumed in the all-day battle, and such firepower intensity was unprecedented in the history of the PLA, and it was completely normal to kill and wound more than 3,000 Vietnamese troops with such powerful firepower.

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