Recently, Yemen's Houthi rebels once again fired two anti-ship ballistic missiles into the southern Red Sea international shipping lane, which aroused a high degree of vigilance from the US command. This missile is considered a new type of missile capable of dealing with large surface ships such as aircraft carriers, and its technology ** has always been a mystery. The United States speculates that China may be the technical supporter of the Houthis, as it is the only country that has publicly displayed such missiles. So, is there any basis for this speculation?How big is the gap between China and the United States in anti-ship ballistic missile technology?
Houthi anti-ship missiles reappear: According to the U.S. Command, the Houthis fired two anti-ship ballistic missiles into the southern Red Sea Passage on March 23 in an attempt to attack merchant ships passing through the area. This is the second time the Houthis have used such missiles in actual combat, the last time was in December 2022, when they fired an anti-ship ballistic missile at the Saudi port of Jeddah, but it was intercepted by Saudi air defenses. An anti-ship ballistic missile is a combination of ballistic and anti-ship missile technology, which can fly at high altitude at supersonic speeds, and then suddenly descend when approaching the target, inflicting a fatal blow on surface ships. The range, speed and maneuverability of such missiles are high, making it difficult for conventional air defense systems to intercept.
The United States questioned the missiles: Faced with the threat of this new type of **, the American side began to suspect that the Houthi missiles came from. The United States believes that the Houthis are Iran's ** people in Yemen, and Iran has been providing them with ** and technical support. But does Iran itself possess the technology for anti-ship ballistic missiles?In an article, the US "National Interest" pointed the object of speculation at China. According to the article, China is currently the only country that has publicly displayed anti-ship ballistic missiles, and its "DF-21D" and "DF-26" missiles are called "carrier killers" and can pose a serious threat to US aircraft carrier battle groups in the western Pacific. It is speculated that China may have transferred the technology of this missile to Iran, which in turn passed it on to the Houthis to create trouble in the Red Sea region.
Comparing U.S. and U.S. Technology Differences: After a preliminary look at the Houthi anti-ship ballistic missiles, let's take a look at the U.S.-China technology gap in this area. First of all, we must make it clear that China's DF-21D and DF-26 missiles are not simple anti-ship ballistic missiles, but conventional medium- and long-range ballistic missiles with multiple strike capabilities. They can deal not only with surface ships, but also with precision strikes against land, air, and even space targets. The range of these missiles also far exceeds that of the Houthi Persian Gulf series of missiles, which can cover the entire western Pacific and Indian Ocean regions.
Second, we must know that China's missiles do not act independently, but as part of the entire "anti-access and area denial" combat system, they cooperate with other reconnaissance, early warning, command, control, communications, electronic warfare, anti-radiation, anti-satellite and other platforms and other platforms to form a complex networked system. The purpose of this system is to effectively prevent US aircraft carrier battle groups and other military forces from entering China's core areas of interest in the event of a conflict, thereby protecting China's sovereignty and security. Therefore, China's anti-ship ballistic missile technology involves not only the performance of the missile itself, but also the construction and operation of the entire combat system. This is a very complex and high-end technical field, which cannot be achieved simply by modifying the missile.
Iran and the Houthis' Persian Gulf series of missiles: In contrast, the Persian Gulf series of anti-ship ballistic missiles used by Iran and the Houthis are actually only some improvements to the traditional short-range tactical ballistic missiles, giving them some anti-ship capabilities. The range of these missiles is generally about 300 kilometers, and the speed does not exceed Mach 3, and there is no good guidance system, so they can only rely on inertial navigation and terminal radar guidance, and their accuracy and maneuverability to the target are very low. The technology of these missiles is mainly Iran's own research and development and imitation, as well as some technologies purchased or acquired from North Korea, China, Russia and other countries.
The development of Iran's missile technology can be divided into three stages: the first stage is from the Islamic Revolution in 1979 to the end of the Iraq War in 1988, during which Iran mainly relied on "Scud" and "Scud B" missiles imported from other countries, as well as "Scud C" missiles obtained from Libya, to carry out retaliatory strikes against Iraq. The second stage was from 1988 to 2006, when Iran began to independently develop and produce missiles, mainly based on improved versions of the "Scud" series of missiles, such as the "Shahab" series of missiles, and the "Nodong" series of missiles imported from North Korea. The third stage, from 2006 to the present, is when Iran began to develop more advanced missiles, such as solid-fuel missiles of the Safir and Simon series, as well as anti-ship ballistic missiles of the Persian Gulf family. The technical level of these missiles, although it has improved, still lags behind the level of countries such as China and the United States.
Differences in Missile Performance and Challenges to the Red Sea Escort Fleet: A comparative analysis shows that there is a huge gap between Iranian and Houthi anti-ship ballistic missiles and China's anti-carrier missile technology. This gap is not only reflected in the performance of the missile, but also in the degree of perfection of the combat system. Therefore, the speculation of the United States does not seem to be very reasonable, and it is unlikely that China will easily transfer its core technology to Iran and the Houthis. So, how much of a threat do these missiles pose to the Red Sea escort fleet?We can analyze it from the following aspects. First of all, in terms of range, these missiles have a short range and can only cover a part of the southern part of the Red Sea, and cannot affect the shipping of the entire Red Sea. Secondly, in terms of speed, these missiles are slow, only about Mach 3, and they slow down when descending at the end of the stage, which gives the air defense system a certain reaction time.
Thirdly, in terms of accuracy, these missiles have low accuracy, can only rely on inertial navigation and terminal radar guidance, have limited ability to locate and identify targets, and are susceptible to jamming and deception. Finally, in terms of numbers, these missiles are few in number and cannot form a saturation attack, nor can they counter the scattered deployment and maneuvering evasion of the fleet. Summed up, the level of threat of these missiles is far from that of China's anti-aircraft carrier missiles. However, this does not mean that we can completely ignore them. Because these missiles still have a certain ability to penetrate defenses, if the method of "guerrilla warfare" is used at the right time and place to harass and interfere with the shipping lanes, it may cause certain losses and troubles to the Red Sea escort fleet.
Conclusion: We can see more clearly the gap between China and the United States in anti-ship ballistic missile technology, as well as the use of Iran and the Houthis in actual combat. China's superiority in this area makes it seem untenable to doubt that it is a technical support provider. However, this does not rule out the possibility that Iran and the Houthis could acquire this technology through other means. Whether this technological battle will evolve into a more tense situation in the future remains the focus of global attention. We hope that all parties can maintain peace and stability in the Red Sea region through dialogue and cooperation and jointly promote global development and progress.