Two years after the delivery of the first B-61-12 tactical nuclear bomb in November 2021, an annual report from the U.S. National Nuclear Security Administration (NNSA) shows that the Air Force is ready to use these on its 20 B-2 Phantom** bombers**—flying-wing jets designed to travel great distances and penetrate enemy airspace without being detected. The striking and extremely expensive spirits are all part of the 509th Bomb Wing, based at Whiteman Air Force Base in Missouri.
The B61-12 actually marked a significant departure from the first 61 models of the B12 tactical gravity bomb, the first of which debuted in the 1960s. Its new tail kit has moving fins and a rotationally stabilized rocket, allowing it to launch from a stand-off distance, landing on average within 30 meters (using an inertial navigation system) or 5 meters (if GPS access) is located at a distance of the designated target. Compare it to its predecessor with an average error of 110-170 meters.
Test variants of the B61-12 nuclear bomb are known to be seen during the 2023 Air Force Xi Joint Test Conference (JTA). U.S. Air Force Wikimedia Commons.
The increased accuracy means that smaller nuclear warheads and half the number of tactical nuclear ** can be used to achieve the same goals as previous incarnations, reducing collateral damage and radioactive fallout. However, critics of nuclear proliferation argue that B61-12 has a so much increase in effectiveness that it has the potential to dangerously increase the use of tactical nuclear weapons.
By 2025, it is expected that about 480 B61-12s will be converted from B61-4 bombs, although parts of B61-3, B61-7 and B61-10 are apparently mixed in. This ostensible Life Extension Program (LEP) for B61-4 is not cheap. A 2012 article estimated that each 825-pound bomb would cost more than its **weight ($18.4 million in 2022 dollars) at $28 million each. The latest NNSA report estimates the total cost of the project at $8.3 billion in 2020 dollars (including approximately $1.2 billion still to be disbursed), while external experts believe cost overruns could bring the final figure closer to $10 billion.
Eventually, the B-61-12 will be certified for use as a replacement for the B-2 (B-21 Raider), as well as the F-35 Lightning II** fighter, the widely used F-16 Fighting Falcon tactical jet fighter, the F-15E Strike Eagle fighter-bomber, and the German and Italian Tornado fighter-bombers. In fact, most of these aircraft have already tried the B-61-12.
However, the B61-12 will not be integrated into the FA-18E F Super Hornet fighters of the Navy and Marine Corps, nor into the Air Force's B-52 and B-1 non-** bombers.
The exact range of the B61-12's standoff capabilities is classified, but due to the lack of a pop-up wing, it is estimated that it will not exceed 15 miles even in ideal conditions (launched from a high altitude).
Nevertheless, even a flight range of 15 miles will significantly increase the survivability of non-** aircraft, which requires the delivery of the older B61 variant almost directly over the target. This operation made it possible to make a suicidal run against any target that would benefit from an unsuppressed modern air defense system. The lack of standoff distance almost means that the descending aircraft is at greater risk of being caught before they can pull away far enough.
In fact, the latest air defense systems pose such a threat that even ** aircraft significantly increases their survivability and flexibility by increasing the range of the confrontation. This explains the priority of the B-2 "Spirit": if the Air Force needs to quickly launch a powerful tactical nuclear attack with minimal risk of losses, it will first resort to this platform. The B-2 will also be able to take advantage of the B-61-12's precision guidance capabilities, which the F-16 or Tornado do do not have, as they have older electronics.
The B-2's stealth-optimized AN APQ-181 radar can also provide critical targeting capabilities in wartime conditions, when GPS is inaccessible or degraded – a technology that the B-2 tested in July 2022 with the dud B61-12 and a new radar-assisted targeting software (RATS) tool.
The B61-12 will replace the B61 Mod-3, -4 and -7 bombs currently in service, which were created between 1979 and 1990. As with these bombs, the yield of the B61-12 is adjustable (or "dialable"), from 0Ranging from 3,000 tons to a maximum of 50,000 tons, the latter was almost three times more powerful than the "Little Boy" atomic bomb dropped on Hiroshima.
This is practically not as extreme as the B61-3 (up to 170 kilotons) and the strategic B61-7 (up to about 350 kilotons). However, due to increased accuracy, craters 50-30 meters wide from 60 thousand tons ** were assessed as reliably destroying targets of bunker size.
50 specialized B61-11 bombs will remain in service with the mod 12 because of their specialized ground penetration capabilities, designed to disable nuclear ** bases and command centers hundreds of feet underground. These 1,200-pound **, made of high-strength steel, have a higher maximum equivalent of 340 or 400 kilotons.
Meanwhile, in October of this year, Biden** announced that he had approved plans to use a high-yield B61-7 model with a B61-13 warhead to provide "additional options for certain harder and larger-area military targets."
Since the B61-12 was originally planned to replace the B61-7, the overall stock of tactical nuclear ** will increase. This means that the future production of the B61-13 (estimated at a total of about 50 bombs) will be at the expense of the B61-12.
The B61-13 may be an administrative strategy to help decommission the B83-1 strategic nuclear bomb, which has a maximum yield of 12 megatons (i.e. 1,200 kilotons). Trump reflexively canceled the scheduled retirement of the B83, and Biden now faces opposition from House Republicans trying to re-cancel the B83-1. Therefore, the B61-13 may correspond to a compromise offered in the form of a modernized replacement for the B83, which has a higher maximum production than the B61-12.
A training model of the B83 nuclear bomb on display at Pease Air Force Base in New Hampshire in 1989. At that time, the 509 Bomb Brigade was stationed there, operating FB-111 Aardvark swing-wing supersonic bombers, capable of carrying B83 with a maximum yield of 12 megatons. Sgt. Ken Hammond of the United States Air Force on Wikimedia Commons.
The B61-11, B83-1 and any future B61-13 will be deployed only by B-2 or B-21 bombers, not fighters. It is important to note that the collateral effects of these large yields** are many times greater, which makes them difficult to use without affecting nearby allies and non-combatants.
The only other non-strategic nuclear ** in service with the United States is the 8-kiloton W76-2 warhead, which can be loaded into the Trident-D5 missiles of the Ohio-class ballistic missile submarines of the US Navy. It is estimated that only 25 W76-2s were built for each Ohio-class submarine, and it is speculated that each Ohio-class submarine could carry one or two missiles with W76-2 warheads when patrolling, as well as more destructive strategic nuclear payloads.
While "tactical" cores are a popular theme in video games and action movies, their use in real life is only authorized in extreme cases. Ever since the United States dropped two atomic bombs on Japanese cities in 1945, there has been a taboo that has not been broken to this day: the use of the least powerful nuclear ** in combat.
At the moment, U.S. tactical nuclear bombs have an impact on the United States in two scenarios: a conflict with a powerful military adversary (Russia or China), and a conflict with a regional power that has acquired or may be about to acquire a nuclear capability (North Korea or Iran, respectively). The latter can still cause a lot of damage, even if they don't reach a real existential threat.
The main justification for US tactical nuclear ** may actually be the deterrence of tactical nuclear ** of other countries. Russia, in particular, has nearly 2,000 tactical nuclear weapons that are not controlled by the treaty. They also have more detailed theories about their potential uses, including limited-scale operations for strategic signaling and intimidation ("escalation to de-escalation") and larger-scale combat operations (using nuclear ** to win on the battlefield).
True, a significant part of the Russian tactical nuclear ** is designed for specialized roles in air defense, anti-ship and anti-submarine warfare. China is not investing in tactical nuclear **, although it is expanding its strategic nuclear arsenal.
A dual-track mobile launcher of the Russian Iskander tactical ballistic missile system on display in Kubinka, Russia, in August 2022. Iskander has been used in a conventional attack on Ukraine, but a nuclear attack can also be carried out. This includes Iskander deployed in the Baltic enclave of Kaliningrad, just within the confines of Berlin. Written by Getty Images
Still, Russian strategists may believe that they can gain a psychological, political, or battlefield advantage using smaller short-range nuclear**, cruise missiles, and Iskander ballistic missiles. They may count on the reluctance of their adversaries to risk retaliating with a more powerful strategy**, which will lead to mutual destruction at the level of civilization. Thus, proponents of American tactical nuclear ** argue that they create the ability to carry out proportional retaliation against a small-scale nuclear attack, thereby reducing the perceived benefits of launching such a nuclear chicken game.
U.S. tactical nuclear gravity bombs also have a strategic deterrent effect, as 100 are stored at bases in Belgium, Germany, Italy, the Netherlands and Turkey for the F-16 and Tornado jet fighters (and eventually the F-35) in these countries. This distracts NATO as a whole from national responsibility for nuclear deterrence, fueling a dynamic in which "an attack on one is an attack on all." Hopefully, this will be enough to stop Russia from thinking that it can politically dismantle the alliance through a nuclear threat.
However, the United States also has its own tactical nuclear ** operational concept. During the Cold War, these operations involved crushing the concentration of invading Soviet tank divisions, which were feared to have so many numerical superiority that NATO ground forces could not stop.
Bomb rack with four B61 tactical nuclear bombs in 1986. During the Cold War, the Pentagon saw tactical nuclear ** as a possible panic button in case NATO forces proved unable to stop more Soviet ground forces. However, the study found that even the large-scale use of small tactical nuclear ** could destroy large swathes of Europe. SSGT Phil Schmitten Wikimedia Commons.
But in the post-Cold War era, the greatest fear is the nuclear ** itself (whether tactical or strategic), especially those trapped in underground silos, which may be difficult to destroy with conventional**. Thus, according to theory, any future use of U.S. nuclear ** – whether tactical or strategic – is likely to be primarily directed against enemy nuclear assets and command and control nodes.
It is worth noting that tactical nuclear ** could be used in response to a nuclear attack (or, more controversially, a preemptive strike) by a "middle power" such as North Korea or Iran, as part of an effort to destroy nuclear assets and their command and control drivers before they strike. The improved accuracy of the B61-12 and the ground penetrating capabilities of the B61-11 can provide important advantages in reliably destroying hardened targets.
That is, it is also possible to target enemy nuclear assets using only powerful conventional means, including JASSM cruise missiles and massive decree-piercing shells that destroy bunkers. This can be done without taking the terrible collateral effects of the use of nuclear ** and the terrible risk of escalation.
All in all, one should hope that the efficiency gains of the B61-12 will never be tested in the real world.