In the curtain of military reform that began in 2015, the PLA not only adjusted the structure of its headquarters, demarcated theaters, established new types of military units, and reorganized army group armies.
As one of the important components of China's armed forces, the Chinese People's Armed Police Force has also carried out important reforms in accordance with the unified deployment of the armed forces.
Reform of the Armed Police Force: Strengthen military attributes and return to the function of training troops to fight wars.
The establishment and structure of the armed police force is facing optimization and adjustment, and there is still room for reform. Former commander Wang Ning pointed out the "five inadaptable" problems: the construction concept is not compatible with the status, the winning ability is not compatible with the task, the talent team is not compatible with the professional attributes, the equipment is not compatible with the generation of capabilities, and the information support is not compatible with the efficiency of action.
In order to build a strong elite soldier and a top soldier in counter-terrorism, handling emergencies on duty, and defending operations, the armed police force needs to benchmark itself against the PLA and promote reform, especially the establishment system of the internal security force.
At present, the distribution of the internal security forces and the establishment of the structure are characterized by localization, which is closely related to the administrative divisions, and it is necessary to explore a rational establishment system to meet the changing needs.
In China's administrative divisions, some irrationalities have always been criticized. For example, it is also a provincial-level administrative structure, except for the Beijing and Xinjiang corps, which are established at the regular army level, and the other corps are all established at the deputy army level.
In prefecture-level administrative regions, regiment-level detachments are generally set up. However, such an organizational approach is not conducive to optimizing the composition of the PAPF. Because, with the same corps, can the Ningxia corps (smaller area, less population) and the Shandong corps (larger area, larger population) undertake the same amount of tasks?
The number of cadres in the large corps is relatively large, and the promotion channels and development stamina are not as advantageous as those in the small corps. Similarly, the detachments of prefecture-level cities vary in size, and the organs and units of small detachments are large and bloated, and they are top-heavy.
Therefore, the deployment and establishment structure of the armed police internal security units should not be set up with complete reference to local administrative divisions, but should be better optimized to enhance the combat capability of the troops.
The PLA army units were reorganized after the military reform, forming 13 group armies, each of which includes six composite brigades and six arms brigades, and the size and combat effectiveness of the troops are basically the same.
This will facilitate the centralized management and unified training of the whole army, and at the same time, it will also be convenient to dispatch troops to carry out temporary tasks during special periods. The establishment of the armed police internal security force can also be reformed with reference to this model.
My two immature ideas are: First, we can carry out a purely militarized organizational reform, refer to the model of the US Army National Guard and the Russian Internal Affairs Forces, break the existing structure of corps and detachments, and set up a brand-new "internal guard division" with "internal guard brigades (regiments)" under it in accordance with geographical distribution and task layout.
In this way, the reformed armed police internal security force will become a veritable "second army" and will be able to better assist the PLA in carrying out defensive operations and diversified tasks.
A valiant force that guarantees the security of Russia.
The second strategy of the US Army National Guard is to consider the actual situation, although the chief commander is set up in the provincial administrative district, but below the chief commander, breaking the restrictions of administrative divisions, according to the task and population distribution, reorganize and merge the original internal guard detachment.
Taking Hebei Province as an example, the provincial capital city can set up a detachment because of its special status and many important institutions, while other places can integrate neighboring cities into a detachment according to the geographical distribution of eastern Hebei, central Hebei, and southern Hebei, so as to optimize the structure and establishment of the troops.
In economically developed or special geographical locations, separate detachments can also be set up, such as the Xiong'an New Area. Newly formed detachments usually do not use the name of the region, but take the numerical number of "XX Detachment XX of the XX Corps".
The detachments of each corps are sorted starting with the 1st detachment and then increasing in turn. In this way, whether fighting at home or abroad, the armed police force has a stronger combat capability and mobility.
Drawing on the experience of the People's Liberation Army's organizational structure reform, the core goal of reforming the structure of the armed police internal security force should be to streamline the organization and optimize the organization. On this basis, it is necessary to firmly grasp the goal of strengthening the army, vigorously strengthen the informationization of the troops, promote the upgrading of the most advanced equipment, and realize the modernization of the troops.
This reform measure is a key step in resolving the structural obstacles and conspicuous contradictions in the armed police force and comprehensively strengthening the building of the armed police force. As a military enthusiast, this is just my personal opinion, and I look forward to everyone working together.