"Power comes out of the barrel of a gun" is a well-known theory of the teacher, but he was not the first to use the barrel of a gun.
In ancient times, too many regime changes were made through the barrel of a gun, the modern Taiping Heavenly Kingdom Movement came from the barrel of a gun, and the Westernization Movement was also based on a barrel of a gun, and Yuan Shikai made the Manchu Dynasty have to accept him through the use of a gun, so that the Xinhai Revolution had to accept him.
The revolutionary activities of the League were basically painstakingly planned and launched against an armed uprising.
The success of the Xinhai Revolution was built on the barrel of a gun.
Chiang Kai-shek was the one who used the barrel of the gun to perfection.
It was with the barrel of a gun that he gradually changed from a small officer in Fenghua to the leader of the Kuomintang.
It was he who taught the Communists the use of the barrel of the gun.
The instructor was initially resistant to the barrel of the gun.
In 1919, the revolution advocated by the faculty was the Revolution of Voice, the Revolution without Blood, and the Revolution Against the Bomb, the Revolution of Blood. It is believed that the powerful are also human beings, and if the powerful is used to defeat the powerful, the result is still the might.
Therefore, he opposed all violence, including the southern ** against Sun Yat-sen, who used violence against the Beiyang warlords in the north.
In 1920, he was enthusiastic about the self-government movement. Believing that self-determination of the provinces was the only way to save China.
But Chiang Kai-shek, after the cooperation of the Kuomintang and the Communist Party, changed the Communists.
The reason why the Communist Party endured Chiang Kai-shek again and again was not only because the Communists had illusions about Chiang Kai-shek, but also because when they did not have a gun, their tolerance for Chiang Kai-shek was a tolerance for strength and a forbearance for the barrel of a gun.
The Zhongshan incident and the April 12 counter-revolutionary coup made the Communists understand that there is no way out for forbearance.
In particular, since the beginning of the year, the warlords have relied on the army in their hands, either to win the championship or to cut off their power, and the "barrel of the gun" has become the main factor in achieving their political goals.
In the face of powerful warlords with guns in various places, Sun Yat-sen realized the importance of mastering the revolutionary armed forces and was determined to build a party army through the establishment of the Whampoa Military Academy to win the victory of the revolution.
However, after the defeat of the Great Revolution in 1927, the number of Communists dropped sharply from more than 60,000 to more than 10,000 in the White Terror created by the Kuomintang reactionaries, and for the first time the Party faced a severe test of life and death.
The reason for this was that the Communists did not have the guns in their hands, and in the face of the bloody suppression of the Communists and the revolutionary masses by force by the Kuomintang reactionaries, they were almost powerless to fight back and paid a heavy price.
In the midst of this painful and bloody lesson, the Party profoundly realized the importance of building a revolutionary armed force.
So at the 87th meeting, the instructor said, "In the past, we scolded Zhongshan for doing military movements, but we did the opposite, not doing military movements, but doing mass movements. ......In the future, it is necessary to pay great attention to the military. It is important to know that power is taken from the barrel of a gun. ”
As a result, we had the armed uprisings represented by the Nanchang Uprising, the Autumn Harvest Uprising, and the Guangzhou Uprising, which were the beginning of the armed struggle under the independent leadership of the Communist Party and the beginning of the Party's formal creation of the people's army.
At the time of the Nanchang Uprising, most of the junior officers and soldiers in the army were not clear about the question of "who to be a soldier for and for whom to fight". According to the party report at the time, on the way south to Guangdong, "the soldiers did not know the significance of the uprising, so the morale of the army was greatly shaken, and many fled." After only a few days of marching, more than a third of the strength was lost, nearly half of the ammunition was abandoned, and the mortars were almost completely lost." As many as 20,000 rebel troops, only more than 800 eventually went to Jinggangshan.
According to the instructor of the troops of the Autumn Harvest Uprising, "the discipline of the troops at that time was very poor, the political level was very low, and there were many wavering elements among the commanders and fighters, and there were many deserters. "There were more than 1,700 troops when they set out from Wenjia City, but when they marched to the foot of Jinggang Mountain after a ten-day march, only more than 700 remained.
During the Guangzhou Uprising, the banner of the "Red Army" was raised for the first time.
At that time, in order to rapidly expand the army, the Soviets proclaimed: "Organize the Workers' and Peasants' Red Army and improve the lives of the soldiers; The salary of the soldiers was increased to 20 yuan. At that time, the monthly salary of the soldiers of the Kuomintang army was less than ten yuan, and the rebel army hoped to attract everyone to join the Red Army with higher salaries.
When the rebel army was forced to withdraw from Guangzhou to the Hailufeng area, they could only give each soldier a silver yuan as pocket money, and the army soon had only two or three hundred men.
It is obviously not feasible to build a people's army by means of high-paying employment.
According to Nie Shuai's later recollections: "It is conceivable that in the old army, with or without the leadership of our party, whether the party's work is strong or weak, it is impossible for the original organizational form and ideological style to adapt to the new revolutionary tasks without a fundamental transformation, and the best way to transform these armies is to have the party's grassroots organizations and integrate them with the local mass movement, to transform the elements of the troops in the struggle, to absorb fresh blood, to temper and test a large number of cadres, and to establish a new relationship between the army and the people and between officers and soldiers. It will bring about a fundamental change in the ideological style of the troops. ”
How, then, should a new army be built?
Nie Shuai and many other Communists realized that "it is impossible to rely on such an army to win the war after the defeat of the revolution."
Communists know through the lessons of blood that they must take up the barrel of a gun and that they must oppose the armed counter-revolution with an armed revolution, but knowing this does not mean that they can use the barrel of a gun.
The gun of the August 1 Nanchang Uprising was pointed at Guangdong, which was the Second Northern Expedition.
The guns of the Canton uprising did not hit the city of Canton.
The guns of the Autumn Harvest Uprising were originally intended to attack Changsha City.
But the Nanchang uprising failed, the Canton uprising failed, and the Autumn Harvest uprising also failed.
In the face of defeat, in the face of the fact that the ranks of the insurrection could collapse at any time, the instructors began to solve the problem. In the end, after the reorganization of Sanwan, the defeated troops were brought to Jinggangshan.
This is not God's choice, it is man's choice.
Chiang Kai-shek not only taught the Communists to pick up the barrel of the gun, but also not to let the barrel of the gun belong only to the individual.
On September 29, 1927, when the troops arrived in Sanwan Village, Yongxin County, Jiangxi Province, they were reorganized under the leadership of the former committee with the instructor as the secretary, that is, the famous Sanwan reorganization.
After reorganization, the unit was reduced from a division to a regiment, and the company was strengthened. At the same time, three major measures have been taken in the troops: "building branches at the company level" and a new party representative system and a democratic system.
Strengthening the party's leadership over the armed forces is the core of Sanwan's reorganization.
In this reorganization, CPC committees have been established at the regiment and battalion levels, and party branches have been established at the company level, which are responsible for leading the troops in carrying out the party's line, principles, and policies as well as the tasks entrusted by the party.
The reorganization clearly stipulates: "Officers and commanders do not beat soldiers, officers and soldiers are treated equally, soldiers have the freedom to hold meetings and speak, cumbersome etiquette is abolished, and the economy is open." "In order to ensure that soldiers have genuine democratic rights, the army has set up soldiers' committees at all levels above the company level, composed of soldiers' elected representatives, to participate in the economic management and administrative management of the troops, and at the same time to do both political and ideological work and mass work under the leadership of party representatives.
This system "is an important factor in destroying the feudal mercenary army" and has eliminated the relations between the officers and men of the army between oppression and oppression, between domination and domination, and has established a consistent internal relationship between the officers and men of the new type of people's army.
Through these measures, the system of the party's leadership over the armed forces has been initially established organizationally.
This is a groundbreaking and major change in the history of the development of the people's army.
The Gutian Conference held in December 1929 systematically answered a series of fundamental questions about the building of the party and the army, and its core was to build the party ideologically and politically.
Thus it became clear that the Red Army was an armed group carrying out the political tasks of the revolution.
It is necessary to educate officers and men on the nature, purpose, and tasks of the Red Army, and to draw a clear line between the Red Army and the Kuomintang Army and other old-style armies; The Red Army had to carry out the three major tasks of fighting wars, raising funds, and doing mass work.
The resolution stressed: "The Red Army is by no means simply fighting a war, but in addition to fighting a war to destroy the enemy's military forces, it must also undertake the important tasks of propagandizing the masses, organizing the masses, arming the masses, helping the masses to establish revolutionary power, and even building the organization of the Communist Party."
To depart from the goals of propaganda, organization, arming and building revolutionary power among the masses is to lose the meaning of the war, that is, to lose the meaning of the existence of the Red Army. ”
The principle of army building established by the Gutian Conference is the basic principle of the CPC in building the people's army, and it has had an extremely far-reaching impact. These principles were not only quickly implemented in the Fourth Army of the Red Army, but also gradually implemented in the Red Army in other base areas, laying the foundation for the building and development of the people's army.
Since then, the party's absolute leadership over the armed forces has become the most distinctive feature of the CPC's armed forces.
At this point, the Communists had a completely different armed force from the Kuomintang army and other old-style armies.
The purpose of bringing guns to the remote rural areas was to carry out armed separatism of the workers and peasants, to start guerrilla warfare, to establish revolutionary base areas in the countryside, that is, to open up a new democratic revolutionary road in which the countryside surrounded the cities and seized power by armed force.
After solving these problems, the teachers were able to use the guns in their hands with ease, and they also provided the most powerful criticism for the Chinese Communists with their criticism, and also provided the world revolution with a Chinese revolutionary road that was different from the road of the October Revolution.
After picking up the barrel of the gun and using the barrel of the gun, the counter-revolutionary forces received the most powerful counterattack from the revolutionary forces. The failure of the counterrevolutionary armed forces in four anti-encirclement and suppression campaigns has fully proved that the power of the gun really lies in its construction and application.
But the method of the teacher's use of the gun was not the method of use prescribed by the Comintern.
The Comintern got to know the teachers little by little through their use of the barrel of the gun.
In 1927, the Comintern, an international organ, published a report on the investigation of the Hunan peasant movement in its 22nd issue, and Bukharin quoted its contents to refute Trotsky.
On March 20, 1930, the official communiqué of the "International News Newsletter" said that the instructor was the founder of the Chinese Communist Party, the founder of the Chinese guerrilla army, and one of the founders of the Chinese Red Army.
In 1935, the Comintern Nos. 33 and 34 published "Industrious Chinese People's Leaders***."
The teacher's transformation and use of the gun barrel was recognized by the Comintern, and the Chinese revolution embarked on a road of independent use of the gun barrel.
The instructors led this people's army to cross the Chishui River four times, get rid of the encirclement and interception of the Kuomintang reactionary army, climb snow-capped mountains and cross grasslands, and the three main forces of the Red Army joined forces in northern Shaanxi, and fought a protracted war against the Japanese invaders, and finally won the victory in the War of Resistance Against Japan, which also made the people's army develop greatly.
In 1949, the Communists finally defeated the Kuomintang reactionary army with the barrel of a gun and established New China.
In 1950, China even sent troops to North Korea, and after confronting the American invaders with the barrel of a gun, it played the national prestige of New China.
Chiang Kai-shek and his generals wondered how the communist army with millet and rifles could defeat their 8 million well-armed Kuomintang troops.
The United States and the United States are puzzled, why did the world's strongest army, navy, and air force lose to the poor and white volunteers?
Because the guns led by the instructors are the people's army.
The regime established by this people's army is the people's power.
Let the gun be in the hands of the party and put the army in the hands of the people to be used, which has become the most distinctive characteristic of a teacher as a great statesman, military strategist, and strategist.