"I think about it from a purely military point of view, and I think this defeat is very bizarre. At the time of the Battle of Menglianggu, the friendly forces on the left and right flanks of the 74th Division were only five or six kilometers apart, so why could the 74th Division not be reinforced for three days? With such uncoordinated coordination and poor combat effectiveness, there is no second way but defeat. β
At that time, he was the director of the Third Department of the Kuomintang Ministry of National DefenseGuo Rugui, summing up the rout in the Battle of Menglianggu, the 74th Division, which was the elite of the elite, was completely annihilated, and made such an evaluation. So what's the truth? Interpreting the reasons for the collapse of the 74th Division of the Kuomintang, why even Guo Rugui feels weird?
Looking back at the historical chapters of the Liberation War,Battle of MengliangguIt is undoubtedly an important page. In the meantime, it is not only the far-reaching impact and practical significance of the development of the situation, but also the fact that through a battle, it is enough to get a glimpse of the root cause of the rout. Leave aside the aftermath,The direct consequence of the Battle of Menglianggu was that the People's Liberation Army annihilated the **74th Division.
The 74th Division is the first of the five main forces, with more than 30,000 people, all American-style equipment, and has also received professional training from the US military, and is known as "the only unit in the squadron that can fight".
During the War of Resistance Against Japanese Aggression, the **74th Division was known as the "Anti-Japanese Iron Army". It is not difficult to get a glimpse of the strong combat capability of the **74th Division, as well as the major achievements of the PLA in this battle. Looking back on the occurrence of the Menglianggu Battle, at that time, the 74th Division was used as the core force, and the 83rd Division and the 25th Division were used as cover to launch an attack on our base area.
* In addition, the 7th Army and the 48th and 65th Divisions were deployed as cover on the left and right flanks, and launched a sharp offensive against our side in the form of sharp arrows. And the direct purpose of this military operation was the headquarters of our army located in the Tangbu area. This offensive was undoubtedly a great plan, and there were no too serious and obvious flaws in tactics, which can be called "the first rank of the enemy general among all the armies."
However, with the subsequent development of the war, the **74th Division, which served as the main attacker, not only failed to directly take the headquarters of our army, but was cut off from contact with other armies, and was completely surrounded by the main force of our army in the Menglianggu area, and all of them were annihilated. Why not only did ** steal chickens, but also lost his wife and soldiers? Of course, it is by no means the so-called **74 division Zhang Lingfu who is greedy for merit, such a statement.
There are no serious mistakes in the deployment of the strategic **, but tactically,Zhang LingfuIn the process of advancing, he sensed the risk of being encircled, and took the initiative to board Menglianggu to defend it, but he was waiting for reinforcements and seeking a duel between the main forces of the two armies, in order to "blossom on the top".
You must know that ** is stronger than our army in frontal combat power, so it is their undisguised strategic intention to seek the main force to fight head-on, but our army uses its strong mobility to carry out guerrilla tactics and avoid the intention of ** frontal decisive battle.
Therefore, Zhang Lingfu's ascension to Meng Lianggu undoubtedly created an opportunity, and Chiang Kai-shek, the Nationalist, and many commanders and fighters noticed this opportunity and ordered the army to fully seize the opportunity to launch a full-scale decisive battle. So, what was the reason for the rout and the total annihilation of Zhang Lingfu's 74th Division?
**"Theory of Contradiction".In it, it provides people with a way to analyze things from a philosophical perspective. In the meantime, everything happens because of both internal and external causes. From this point of view,**The fall of the 74th Division also had internal and external causes
In the above-mentioned passage by Guo Ruhuai, it is pointed out that when the Battle of Menglianggu occurred, there were many friendly troops near the 74th Division, and the distance between them was not too far, only about five or six kilometers away. Such a distance for the army can be reached by an all-out charge at any cost. However, Zhang Lingfu's army held for several days and could not wait for reinforcements.
Therefore,Guo Ruhuai attributed the failure of the Menglianggu Battle to two factors: internal incoordination and poor combat effectivenessγAnd these two factors are undoubtedly the internal reasons for the destruction of the **74th Division, and also one of the internal reasons for the defeat of ** in the entire Liberation War.
First of all, the internal inconsistencies or contradictions are obvious. In the impression of ordinary people, from the Chinese People's Liberation Army, we can easily perceive that when different units fight together, they can be called their own brothers.
Of course, nothing is absolute, and although there are contradictions within our army, they are only isolated cases and rarely cause trouble in the face of major issues of right and wrong. On the other handThe internal contradictions are obvious, after all, there are many factions within the country, and although the different factions are calm on the surface, they are deeply antagonistic inside.
Secondly, the idea of internal merit is also very serious. Therefore, when war broke out, the numerous contradictions undoubtedly laid the groundwork for the incoordination and non-cooperation between the two sides. Between different factions, it is difficult to support with all their might, or even unwilling to support at all.
Facts speak louder than words, and the fall of the previous **72nd Division is undoubtedly the best example.
Long before the Battle of Menglianggu, the military operations with our army have begun, and in this process, neither ** nor our army has achieved major results, compared to 20,000 The only important result of our army is the total annihilation of the **72nd Division.
At that time, the People's Liberation Army seized the opportunity to launch an attack on the 74th Division, but the first side was aware of our army's military operations and made arrangements early to respond. Faced with the occurrence of this situation and unwilling to miss the opportunity, the People's Liberation Army quickly adjusted its target to attack the **72nd Division. The result was the complete annihilation of the enemy's 72nd Division and the capture of the commander of the **72nd Division.
At that time, when the two armies were fighting, the nearby ** troops were only a dozen kilometers away, and there was a chance to make reinforcements, but from the beginning to the end of the war, the nearby ** troops were always stationary. The reason for this is that the 72nd Division is not a direct unit of Chiang Kai-shek, and it is also a different faction from the nearby ** troops.
In view of this, if reinforcements are made, it will naturally lead to the attrition of their own troops and other problems, so they simply sit still and watch the tiger fight. In the process of the annihilation of the 72nd Division, the ** command must have known the situation, but reinforcements still did not arrive. Then there are two possibilities of whether the ** command gave the order or not.
If the ** command fails to respond, then its internal contradictions can be seen. If the ** command has reacted, and the nearby troops are still holding their ground, then it can also be seen that the ** command is almost ineffective against the army. Regardless of any possibility, the root cause still lies in the internal contradictions of **.
Returning to the Battle of Menglianggu, the **74th Division took the initiative to board Menglianggu and tried to wait for reinforcements to counter-encircle the main force of the People's Liberation Army, but the whole process failed to wait for the reinforcements that were close at hand, which was undoubtedly the above-mentioned heart at work.
Secondly, among the internal factors pointed out by Guo Ruhuai, there is also the factor of weak combat effectiveness. This reason is also the most internal cause, but it is not entirely an internal cause, and there are also external factors involved.
However, from the perspective of internal factors, it is still the internal contradiction of the above-mentioned **, since there are many contradictions and interests involved, other armies are naturally unwilling to help, so the combat effectiveness will naturally shrink significantly.
Finally, there is also an internal factor that led to the collapse of the **74th Division, which lies in the special status of the **74th Division and the arrogance of Zhang Lingfu himself.
It has been mentioned above that the 74th Division is the main force among the main forces, and it is precisely because of this that whether it is Zhang Lingfu as the division commander or the style of the entire army, there will naturally be a kind of arrogance of "being a man".
As the saying goes, "freezing three feet is not a day's cold", and this arrogance will inevitably affect the relationship between Zhang Lingfu and other army leaders, as well as between the 74th Division and other troops.
All in all, one of the particularities of the 74th Division is also the special one that is "isolated", which is also the fundamental reason for the merit and not to be proud of. Therefore, when the 74th Division was trapped in Menglianggu, the rest of the troops were inevitably born"We, shrimp soldiers and crab generals, are worthy of saving your 74th Division? β
Through the above, it is not difficult to get a glimpse of the whole incident, ** There are many internal contradictions, and it is these internal factors that have led to the "weird" occurrence in Guo Ruhuai's eyes step by step, and in essence, everything has already been doomed. Therefore, before his death, Zhang Lingfu tried to find a way to write a letter to Chiang Kai-shek, and the most eye-catching content during this period was"** The various armies within the country have their own plans and have different dreams in the same bed. β
Internal causes are the root of the occurrence of things, and at the same time, certain external factors are needed to promote the occurrence of things, so in the battle of Menglianggu, where are the external factors that led to the total annihilation of the 74th Division?
Following on from the above, Guo Ruhuai once mentioned that one of the major reasons for the rout was the lack of combat power, and this place also had external factors in addition to internal factors**'s lack of combat power is not only unwilling to contribute, but also has a certain real component.
Looking back on the Battle of Menglianggu, there was such a process, in order to climb Menglianggu, Zhang Lingfu abandoned heavy equipment and went up the mountain lightly. Compared with the PLA, their advantage lies in the number of equipment and personnel. ** The troops have a large amount of advanced American equipment.
Based on this kind of crushing by force, compared with the PLA, the use of terrain is not flexible, in other words, "one force to reduce ten meetings, one force to break ten thousand laws".
Therefore, in some special terrain operations, the PLA is often weaker, and in the case of certain obstacles to the use of heavy equipment in mountainous areas, whether it is the 74th Division or other troops, the combat strength will inevitably be affected.
On the other hand, the People's Liberation Army (PLA) has always been arduous, and taking advantage of the terrain to gain a little advantage for itself is always considered, so it has become a major characteristic of the PLA that is good at making good use of the terrain.
In addition, the main external factor for the rout and the total annihilation of the 74th Division lies in the command and combat capability of the PLA. Through the above-mentioned internal contradictions, the PLA is not obvious, so the PLA naturally has a great advantage in the command of the army.
With this advantage, the PLA can give full play to the role of strategy and tactics, in contrast, the original good strategy can not operate perfectly. Just like the confrontation between the two armies before the Battle of Menglianggu, we can get a glimpse of the PLA's superiority in command and combat capability.
In the "Memoirs of Su Yu's War", General Su Yu once pointed out that the Battle of Menglianggu was a result of our army's command and operation. In essence, there is no problem with the strategic layout of **, as well as Zhang Lingfu's tactics.
Looking back at the background of the Menglianggu Campaign, it is a key attack on northern Shaanxi and the liberated areas of Shandong by gathering 450,000 troops. On the PLA side, the East China Field Army had nearly 270,000 troops, commanded by Marshal ** and General Su Yu.
* The tactics used in the field are the technique of "combining vertical and horizontal", different armies are closely connected, greatly reducing the density of troops and advancing slowly, and any situation occurs in the troops, and the nearby troops can make reinforcements in time, or even bite back.
It is precisely for this reason that in the early stage of the war, our army did not achieve important combat results. However, in response to the opponent's military deployment, Marshal ** and General Su Yu made corresponding countermeasures.
As everyone knows, what our army is good at is guerrilla warfare, and this tactic can make full use of the advantages of our army's strong mobility. Because of this,Our army's countermeasure is to "take the initiative to attack at the same time, fight if you can fight, and run away if you can't fight."In the process of this, the enemy is constantly mobilized in search of combat opportunities.
This countermeasure was obviously effective, and it was precisely because of this that the above-mentioned **72nd Division was annihilated. Although the results were not significant and could not effectively disintegrate the enemy's attack, this was obviously able to confuse the enemy and avoid the direct engagement of the main force that ** wanted.
It is precisely for this reason that the **, which is in a passive position, tried to adjust its strategy and take the initiative to attack, and there was also the practice of the above-mentioned 74th Division and other units jointly attacking the headquarters of our army.
Obviously, there is no problem with this approach, after all, if it succeeds, it will be able to "take the head of the enemy among all the armies." If it does not succeed, the PLA will inevitably need to assemble the main force for defense, and thus the desire of the main force to directly confront each other has been achieved.
However, after perceiving the first intention, General Su Yu reacted quickly, first quietly transferring troops to cut off the 74th Division's connection with other troops, and at the same time intercepting all reinforcements for the reinforcements of the 74th Division, and finally gathering the main force to do his best to quickly annihilate the 74th Division.
Therefore, the ** troops, which were already unwilling to reinforce because of internal contradictions, were intercepted and then "pushed the boat down the river", and among them, there were also ** who followed the order and struggled to break through, but they were also resisted on the basis of our army's early preparations.
Throughout the entire combat process, our army's use of its own characteristics or its command is an important factor leading to defeat. But why was our army able to effectively annihilate the 74th Division while fully intercepting reinforcements? Such a big move was obviously prepared for a long time, and it wasSo it's so accurate, it's a piece of information.
Many people often summarize the battle of Menglianggu and often ignore the important role that a piece of information can produce. Intelligence is a major task that cannot be ignored when the two armies are at war, and an accurate piece of information may lead to a change in the tide of a war.
At that time, when the 74th Army and other troops were marching towards the PLA headquarters, General Su Yu had already noticed something unusual, and at the same time, an intercepted telegram confirmed his suspicions.
This piece of military intelligence is the deployment of combat power and the initial combat route. Therefore, after getting the information, General Su Yu immediately let people verify it, and according to this information, the initiative that had just been taken away in this war was taken back again.
From the perspective of the 74th Division, such a telegram intercepted by mistake by the rear command was undoubtedly a major external factor affecting its direction and doomed the course of history.
As far as this is concerned, the history of the rout of ** and the total annihilation of the 74th Division is no longer enough to be weird, and the interaction between internal and external factors dooms the destruction of the 74th Division and the end of **.