In 1965, with a deep sense of homesickness, Mr. Chiang took the initiative to propose the idea of returning to the mainland, and gave six key conditions. Surprisingly, ** accepted his offer almost without thinking.
However, when Mr. Jiang was about to nod his head to realize this historic moment, he fell into deep thought. Although the answer is close at hand, and the two sides of the strait can be reunited with just one click, why hasn't he made that move for a long time?
The reasons for this are intriguing.
With the precipitation of the years, Chiang Kai-shek's emotions are increasingly inclined to the memory of his hometown, and the feelings of returning to his roots are deeply imprinted in his heart. This deep homesickness prompted him to take the initiative in 1965 and engage in a meaningful dialogue with the CCP through the emissary.
In this meeting, he clearly put forward six key demands, eager to realize the desire to return to the roots.
When Chiang Kai-shek returned to the mainland as president of the Kuomintang as the old minister, he could choose to settle down in any province except Zhejiang, but only if he continued to lead the Kuomintang.
Taiwan Province, on the other hand, enjoys a high degree of autonomy under the leadership of Chiang Ching-kuo, and is fully responsible for all affairs except for military and diplomatic powers, which are valid for 20 years, and a new round of consultations will be held after the expiration of the period.
Taiwan needs military and economic assistance independent of the United States, and in case of financial difficulties, Beijing will provide subsidies in line with the amount of American aid. Taiwan's navy and air force were placed under the command of Beijing, and the army was reduced to four divisions, of which the first division was stationed in Xiamen and Kinmen, and the third division remained in Taiwan.
Xiamen and Kinmen were jointly established as a special free zone, which became a bridge between Beijing and Taiwan. We are committed to maintaining and improving Taiwan's official rank and treatment, as well as the people's livelihood security.
** Accepting with an open mind and expecting reunification, however, in the face of these proposals, Chiang Kai-shek suddenly changed his mind.
This back-and-forth was not the first time Chiang Kai-shek had shown a change in strategy. As early as 1950, he tried to contact the mainland under the name of Li Cibai, and although Chiang Kai-shek had not been in exile in Taiwan for a long time, he was eager to regain his strength and regain lost territory, but the reality was unforgiving, and his strength was no longer enough to deal with it.
This is because the People's Liberation Army (PLA) has been preparing for an offensive against Taiwan in August, and the support of the United States has waned.
The United States abandoned its support for the Kuomintang in exile in Taiwan and instead sought contacts with the Chinese Communist Party. However, Chiang's misjudgment at a critical moment led to tensions with Truman.
Under a series of heavy blows, Chiang Kai-shek was anxious and eagerly sent Li Cibai to the mainland to seek peace. However, the CCP insisted"Reunify Taiwan by force"The first peace talks unfortunately ended in vain.
While Taiwan was still striving for reunification, the clarion call to resist US aggression and aid Korea sounded in July, prompting the resumption of operations to be suspended and providing Chiang Kai-shek with a rare buffer period. As the war intensified and Sino-US relations became tense, the United States took the opportunity to re-woo Chiang's clique.
Behind the negotiations, Chiang Kai-shek's peace talks were not sincere enough, and after the PLA withdrew, he decisively recalled Li Cibai, insisted on the dream of returning to the mainland, and planned a potential counterattack.
In the face of post-war transformations, China's strategy for Taiwan's reunification has been reinvented, and it is committed to the realization of peaceful means. In 1955, at the Bandung Conference, China made it clear that China was eager to restore its sovereignty over Taiwan through peaceful means under the existing premise, which was our firm position and innovative path to resolve the Taiwan issue at that time.
As China entered the critical stage of comprehensive socialist construction in 1956, a peaceful and stable domestic environment became the cornerstone of national development. In April of the same year, ** further elaborated on China's position on the peaceful liberation of Taiwan: "Harmony is precious, and all Chinese sons and daughters belong to a patriotic family, treat each other with integrity, and respect free entry and exit." β
Such a principle demonstrates our profound understanding and persistent pursuit of peaceful reunification.
Just as the fallen leaves will always return to the roots, no matter how long the journey of life is, the old heart yearns for the homeland. Chiang Kai-shek, a native of Fenghua, Zhejiang, had a particularly deep attachment to his hometown, and he longed to spend a peaceful old age there in his seventies.
In view of the common desire of both sides of the strait -- to return to the warm embrace of the motherland, the timing of the peace talks is particularly crucial. ** personally sent a letter to this end, and after careful consideration, the Communist Party appointed Zhang Shizhao, a well-known patriot who had participated in the peace negotiations, to come forward, and his profound knowledge and patriotic feelings were trusted by **.
Given Zhang Shizhao's previous seniority in the Kuomintang, it was fitting to send him to negotiate. However, despite the favorable conditions, his movement in Taiwan remains restricted, so we sought a neutral channel to deliver important information.
Under the ingenious arrangement of the Prime Minister, Zhang Shizhao met with Xu Xiaoyan, the former propaganda minister of the Kuomintang. Zhang Shizhao personally delivered a handwritten letter from the leader of the Communist Party of China to Xu Xiaoyan, imploring him to serve as a bridge to convey to Chiang Kai-shek our sincere desire for the early reunification of the two sides of the Taiwan Strait.
Chiang Kai-shek was deeply moved by Xu Xiaoyan's swift delivery of the letter, and he was deeply moved after reading it with great engrossion. According to Xu Xiaoyan's later recollection, Chairman Jiang at that moment rarely showed deep tiredness, and after careful consideration, he affectionately thanked Xu Xiaoyan: "I will remember your dedication. β
In this letter, ** expressed his ardent hope for the early reunification of the two sides of the strait with sincere feelings, and invited at the end: "The Fenghua mausoleum in my hometown is still the same, and the flowers and plants in Xikou are waiting, and I sincerely invite Mr. to return to his homeland and revisit." β
This sentence deeply touched Chiang Kai-shek's inner feelings. When the Kuomintang was defeated and retreated, he returned to his hometown to visit his mother because he missed his homeland, and he was stranded in Taiwan and failed to return.
Taking advantage of this emotional opportunity, Chiang Kai-shek appointed Song Yishan to the mainland to negotiate with the Communists. However, the failure of the negotiations may have been rooted in Chiang Kai-shek's own failure to properly handle the high-level exchange.
Because Song Yishan secretly met with Prime Minister Li Weihan and had an in-depth dialogue with Minister Li Weihan.
Song Yishan actively conveyed Taiwan's desire for peaceful engagement, and visited Beijing's famous attractions such as Tiananmen Square, the Forbidden City, the Summer Palace, and Xiangshan in two weeks, which gave him a deeper fondness for China.
Therefore, after the talks, he devoted himself to writing a detailed report of 15,000 words, detailing the course of the negotiations and enthusiastically praising the vitality and vitality of the mainland and the Communist Party at that time.
However, this sincere report embarrassed Chiang Kai-shek and caused unhappiness.
Mr. Jiang found it difficult to agree with the prosperity and development of the mainland, and Song Yishan's letter was like a slap in the face, pointing to the disillusionment of the dream of "recovering the country". Mr. Chiang's anger was palpable, and he decided categorically to prevent Song Yishan's return, believing that he had been deeply influenced by communism and feared that the beliefs of others would be affected.
The peace talks, which should have been expected, eventually collapsed due to Mr. Chiang's anger.
Dating back to that crucial meeting in 1965, both the KMT and the CCP attached great importance to it, and regarded it as the "third hand in hand" after two glorious cooperation in history (the Northern Expedition during World War I and the anti-Japanese resistance during World War II).
He confidently predicted that just as the first two collaborations led to victory, the third cooperation will also lead to Taiwan's smooth return and push forward the great cause of national integrity and reunification.
Let us look forward to that day sooner rather than later.
At the critical moment towards the third negotiation, in 1963, ** drew on the wisdom of history and extracted it from the letter to Chiang Kai-shek in 1956"One outline and four eyes"Idea.
The core proposition is clear and unambiguous: Taiwan must be returned to China. These four points of consensus include: (1) Taiwan's internal affairs, such as personnel management and military decision-making, are under the sole responsibility of Chiang Chung-cheng, but the power of foreign affairs belongs to **; 2) For Taiwan's economic development, ** is willing to provide financial support to solve financial problems; (3) The social reform matters should be postponed, and the opinions of Jiang Zhongzheng and the local people should be respected, and the opinions of the local people should be discussed and promoted in a timely manner; (4) The two sides pledged not to interfere with each other, paving the way for a possible future cooperative relationship.
This principle embodies the spirit of peaceful reunification and mutual respect.
The spiritual essence of 'One Program and Four Eyes' is strikingly similar to Chiang Kai-shek's six-point proposition that followed, and the two concepts resonate and foreshadow'One country, two systems'The birth of the prototype. After in-depth consultations, Chiang also revealed his six key demands, and the whole process unfolded in an orderly manner.
But despite all the good news, why didn't the collaboration come to fruition? The answer lies in the analysis of Chiang Kai-shek's personal history. "
Under the baptism of the three major battles, Chiang Kai-shek's defeat was irretrievable, marking an overwhelming victory in the War of Liberation. In 1949, the wheels of history were rolling, and Chiang Kai-shek's plane carried his helplessness and reluctance, bidding farewell to his former center of power.
At that moment, he had mixed feelings in his heart, looking at the familiar land, knowing that this parting might be far away. However, even in Taiwan, the flame of return burned in Chiang Kai-shek's heart, and he was convinced that Taiwan was a temporary stronghold, hiding his dream of reorganizing the mainland.
Behind this decision is his far-reaching considerations.
Taiwan once dominated the historical node, and its excellent geographical location and natural advantages complement each other. The rich military legacy, derived from Japan's post-war withdrawal, laid a solid foundation for Taiwan.
During the Westernization Movement, the governor of Taiwan was determined to reform and promoted the rapid development of this land. This combination of forces made Chiang Kai-shek have a firm belief that the reconquest of lost territory was not out of reach.
However, while Chiang Kai-shek was actively preparing the blueprint, the U.S. intervention strategy was secretly hindering, trying to shape the mainland and Taiwan into an insurmountable "** pattern."
In 1950, the United States fought"Protect the Taiwan Strait"The following year, he signed the U.S.-Chiang Mutual Defense Treaty with Chiang Kai-shek, which seriously violated China's sovereignty.
In 1958, the United States instigated the withdrawal of Kuomintang troops from Kinmen and Matsu in a vain attempt to create a product"***"of the scheme. Faced with this provocation, the PLA acted decisively and shelled Kinmen.
Chiang Kai-shek saw the opportunity to counterattack and decided to hold on, and this history revealed the complex international situation at that time and China's firm position.
The U.S. tried to intervene in the hope that the Chinese Communists would suspend their shelling of Kinmen in order to induce the Kuomintang to withdraw, and they promised the PLA that they would intervene after the Kuomintang retreated.
However, the Kuomintang and the Communist Party saw through the trickery of the United States and stood their own ground. As a result, the armed forces on both sides of the strait formed a tacit understanding and followed"Single-day shelling, two-day truce"to accurately hit enemy beach targets and ensure that no civilians or positions are harmed.
Under sustained international pressure, Chiang Kai-shek chose to start peace talks with the Communists.
On July 26, 1965, Kuomintang veteran Li Zongren left the motherland for 16 years, and finally set foot on his homeland, and the historic meeting with the great man *** Prime Minister was like a reunion after a long absence.
On the same day, Chiang Kai-shek welcomed Cao Juren in a special way, and he carried the "Linjiang Immortal" inscribed by ***, symbolizing the historical convergence and reconciliation of the two generations.
Have you ever remembered that Cao Juren's poems have profound meanings'At that time, the bright moon shone on the clouds, and the heart wished to reflect China'γIn his later years, Chiang Kai-shek cherished the feeling of return, and his desire for the reunification of the motherland was like the way home under the bright moon.
He resolutely put forward six ideas, and the chairman showed the courage of a great country and readily agreed. However, despite the good intentions of both sides, this historic meeting was ultimately unsuccessful and ended in regret. "
Therefore, although the 1965 peace talks were about to usher in the dawn, Chiang Kai-shek chose to retreat at this moment.
In 1972, the hope of resuming peace talks was ignited, and Cao Juren, as a key link, unfortunately passed away in this year. Then, although the 92-year-old Zhang Shizhao took over the negotiations, he also died soon after in his dealings with the Kuomintang.
Regrettably, Chiang Kai-shek bid farewell to the world in Taipei in the same year, which led to another break in the communication chain between the two sides. The wheels of history seem to have come to a standstill after the successive departures of these important figures.
Although the recent suspension of peace talks has temporarily cast a shadow over Taiwan's return to the motherland, the unremitting efforts of the Kuomintang and the Communist Party have not been forgotten. The regrets left over from this period of history are still reminding us today that although the pace of Taiwan's return to the motherland has been delayed, it is the trend of the times.
With China's growing strength, the balance of cross-strait reunification has tilted. In the future, Taiwan's return is only a matter of time, and the integrity and unity of the motherland are our common expectations.