With "214. The Kinmen Fishing Boat Case" The first negotiation was fruitless, and the relevant institutions in the Taiwan region fell into a situation of passing the buck to each other. At a time when negotiations between the mainland and Taiwan are heating up, the US-British think tank has launched a review of the previous war games in the Taiwan Strait over the past 10 years, in an effort to find a strategy to prevent cross-strait reunification.
Robert Kitchin of the International Maritime Center, a US think tank, and chief strategic researcher of the British Navy, wrote an article pointing out that their analysis of the 12 strategic war games in the Taiwan Strait conducted in the past 10 years shows that the United States and its allies have repeatedly lost in the face of the reunification process of the squadron, with only four narrow victories, and the remaining eight ended in heavy defeats or biased defeats, a phenomenon that should arouse a high degree of vigilance in the West.
Kitchin believes that if a direct military conflict breaks out between China and the United States over the Taiwan Strait issue, it will be an evenly matched but extremely cruel war, which can be called unprecedented since the end of World War II. Still, the United States and its allies have not lost the possibility of victory, and if they can get the four key variables right, they can expect to gain the upper hand in this war.
The report points out that the four variables are that Taiwan must maintain sufficient military stockpiles, Taiwan must demonstrate effective resistance, and the United States must be able to quickly intervene and get allies to support military operations at the first opportunity. Without any of these favorable factors, it will be difficult for the United States and its allies to win the war.
Although Western think tanks have summarized four key variables, it will not be easy for the United States to grasp these factors. Although Western politicians can influence military aid to Taiwan, strengthen armaments, or mobilize allies' frontline positions through covert political means, it is obviously impossible to ask whether the Taiwan region and the American people are willing to spontaneously trigger and participate in a bloody war that should not have happened. It is also unknown whether the United States will be able to bear such a heavy price internally.
In addition, although the U.S. and British reports analyzed the equipment, tactics, and deployment of the squadron, they could not quantify the Chinese people's firm will and determination for reunification. Nor can they understand what kind of energy China might be able to generate for reunification. Obviously, these factors cannot be described simply in numbers and words, and they are even more difficult to estimate.
The West needs to realize that while political, economic, military, and other data can be quantified, people's thoughts, passions, and perceptions are not easily quantifiable. The Chinese people's idea of reunification is not only deep-rooted, but also regarded as the highest belief and honor of the individual and even the country.
Therefore, no matter how the United States and the West play war games on the Taiwan Strait issue, as long as they cannot measure the key factor of people's hearts, they will not be able to get an accurate answer. The interference of external forces in the Taiwan issue is not only unpopular, but also directly reveals the huge flaws and unreliability of the so-called war games of the United States and the West.