The Huaihai Campaign was a key battle in the War of Liberation, which began in November 1948 and ended in January 1949, and was one of the three major battles of the War of Liberation. The result of this battle was that the Chinese People's Liberation Army defeated the main forces of the Kuomintang army and laid the foundation for the liberation of the country. In the movie "Armageddon", Chiang Kai-shek was very confident in the Huaihai Battle at first, and even said the words "600,000 against 800,000, the advantage is mine".
However, under Chiang Kai-shek's superiority of 600,000 to 800,000, what was the reason why the Kuomintang would lose the Huaihai Campaign?The following will analyze the causes and results of the Huaihai Battle from several aspects. First of all, in terms of strategic layout, the Huaihai Battle was an active offensive by the Chinese People's Liberation Army, while the Kuomintang army was passively defensive. Prior to this, the People's Liberation Army had annihilated the main forces of the Kuomintang army in the northeast in the Liaoshen Campaign, making the situation in the eastern region favorable to the People's Liberation Army.
Although the strength of the People's Liberation Army at that time was only 600,000, less than the 800,000 of the Kuomintang, they were divided into three routes, east, west and south, and attacked and encircled the Kuomintang army in many ways. In contrast, the Kuomintang army was in a passive defensive state in the Huaihai Campaign, lacking clear strategic goals and directions. Their main force consists of the first.
The 1st and 2nd and 12th Group Armies were composed of a total of 800,000 troops, distributed in northern Jiangsu, northern Henan, and southwestern Shandong.
When the Liaoshen Battle ended, the Kuomintang fell into chaos, and the troops in the Central Plains were also panicked when they learned of the news. Chiang Kai-shek formulated the "Plan for the Battle of Xu Beng", but the cadres within the Kuomintang passed the buck to each other and were unwilling to take responsibility. In addition, the Kuomintang army failed to make effective use of air and firepower superiority in the Huaihai Campaign, but was constrained and weakened by the mobility and flexibility of the People's Liberation Army.
Thus, in terms of strategic layout, the People's Liberation Army set clear goals and plans, while the Kuomintang army lacked overall unity and initiative. The People's Liberation Army (PLA) demonstrated excellent command skills and rich combat experience in the Huaihai Campaign, while the Kuomintang troops made serious mistakes and mistakes.
The People's Liberation Army (PLA) has adopted flexible and changeable tactical means, including camouflage, concealment, luring the enemy, detours, night attacks, and surprise attacks, and is good at making use of factors such as terrain, weather, and time to create favorable combat conditions for itself. In addition, the People's Liberation Army (PLA) has given full play to the role of mass forces, organized local armed forces and militias, and provided them with intelligence, material and transportation support.
In contrast, the command errors of the Kuomintang army led to the sluggishness of the battle and the encirclement and annihilation, the failure to retreat in time, the holding of positions, and finally the encirclement of the People's Liberation Army. The Kuomintang army failed to effectively mobilize and concentrate its forces, but dispersed and isolated, putting itself at a disadvantage. They also did not pay attention to the night combat capability of the People's Liberation Army, underestimating the enemy.
In addition, the People's Liberation Army (PLA) has demonstrated a high degree of combat effectiveness and morale, has strong political convictions and revolutionary enthusiasm, believes that it is fighting for the interests of the people and the future of the country, strictly observes discipline and organization, supports and cooperates with each other, and has a tenacious fighting spirit and a spirit of sacrifice. In contrast, the Kuomintang army had low political motivation and confidence, lacked discipline and organization, was suspicious and convoluted by each other, and lacked fighting spirit and sacrificial spirit.
In the face of the PLA's powerful offensive and various difficulties, some Kuomintang generals and soldiers lost the confidence and will to resist. There were some mutinies and surrenders within the Kuomintang army, such as the defection of Liu Ruming, commander of the Fourth Appeasement Zone, the surrender of Li Mi, commander of the 13th Corps, and the surrender of some troops of Sun Yuanliang, commander of the 16th Corps. These events severely weakened the combat effectiveness and effectiveness of the Kuomintang army, resulting in a crushing defeat in the Huaihai Campaign, resulting in a large loss of personnel, equipment, and territory.
This phenomenon of mutiny and surrender reflected the political, ideological, and organizational corruption and instability of the Kuomintang army, as well as the loss of support and trust of the Kuomintang regime among the masses. Therefore, in terms of the quality of the army, the People's Liberation Army has an advantage and attractiveness, while the Kuomintang army is at a disadvantage and decline. Politically and ideologically, the People's Liberation Army (PLA) represented the tide of history and the voice of the people during the Huaihai Campaign, while the Kuomintang army was the enemy of the people and ran counter to it.
The People's Liberation Army represented the leadership of the Communist Party of China and the ideal of socialism in the Huaihai Campaign, and conformed to the fundamental interests and aspirations of the Chinese people. The People's Liberation Army (PLA) won the support of the broad masses of the people in the Huaihai Campaign, forming a strong political foundation and social force. In addition, the People's Liberation Army also displayed the image and demeanor of New China in the Huaihai Campaign.