Before 2030 arrives, Russia will not easily use nuclear weapons against Ukraine

Mondo Military Updated on 2024-02-29

Russian military experts are concerned about the in-depth analysis of the use of tactical nuclear **

Since the beginning of the Russia-Ukraine conflict, discussions about the use of tactical nuclear ** in local conflicts have been constantly echoing in the military and political spheres. This idea is derived from the document "On the basic principles of state policy in the field of naval activities of the Russian Federation until 2030". Paragraph 37 of the document clearly states: "In the context of an escalation of military conflicts, demonstrating readiness and determination to use non-strategic nuclear ** use of force is an effective deterrent." However, despite the clarity of the wording, the complexity and risks of this concept in practice are far beyond the scope of a single document.

The Western world's long-standing understanding of nuclear ** seems to be more of a symbolic meaning as a "ceremonial sword". Under this understanding, nuclear ** has become a tool to draw red lines and demonstrate strength, rather than lethality in actual war**. However, a series of events in recent years, such as the practice of the Northern Military District, have ruthlessly shattered this illusion. It turns out that mere statements about putting nuclear forces on high alert are not enough to influence the continued participation of supporters of the Ukrainian regime in the conflict. This makes some voices start to say whether more practical action should be taken, such as the use of tactical cores.

It was proposed that a one-time nuclear ** strike on a target chosen by the Kyiv regime would allow the rapid achievement of all the stated military and political goals. In their opinion, such a blow will not only be able to force the Armed Forces of Ukraine to flee and liberate most of the territory, but also save the lives of countless soldiers. However, this seemingly humanitarian action has raised many concerns among military experts.

First, judging by the classical doctrine of nuclear deterrence, the use of nuclear ** is not a simple decision. It needs to be based on rigorous mathematical calculations, taking into account factors such as the number of warheads, the technical capabilities of the delivery vehicle, the flight time of the warhead, the possible trajectory, the radius of damage, and circular deflection. However, the new doctrine seems to be based more on the assumption that the enemy will give in out of fear. The rationality of this assumption is difficult to verify in reality.

Secondly, there are also great technical challenges in the use of tactical nuclear **. On the one hand, a 100% success rate must be ensured, as any failure can have catastrophic consequences. This includes the smooth execution of the chain of command, the safety of the aircraft carrier, the prevention of enemy interception, and many other links. On the other hand, even if a successful launch and hit the target, there is no guarantee that it will be possible to fully control the subsequent development of the situation. After all, nuclear ** is huge, and if used incorrectly, it is likely to trigger a chain reaction that will lead to a further deterioration of the situation.

In addition, experts are concerned about the political and diplomatic risks that may arise from the use of tactical nuclear **. On the one hand, such actions could undermine the existing international order and rules and provoke a strong reaction from other countries. On the other hand, once the precedent for the use of nuclear ** is opened, it is difficult to guarantee that other countries will not follow suit, leading to further proliferation and misuse of nuclear **.

Specific to the tactical nuclear ** itself, such as Russia's "Iskander" operational-tactical missile system, although it has many advantages, such as flexible deployment and difficult interception, its use still needs to be carefully considered. After all, any ** is a double-edged sword, and if you use it incorrectly, you may injure yourself.

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