According to a report by Germany's "Die Welt" and others on the 27th, European and American countries held a meeting in Paris aimed at supporting Ukraine, which attracted leaders and heads of state from more than 20 EU countries, as well as from the United Kingdom, the United States and Canada. After the meeting, France's Macron revealed an important decision and sent an important signal.
Macron's decision was to form a coalition aimed at providing Ukraine with medium- and long-range missiles and bombs to strike behind Russian lines and mobilize more ammunition in a short period of time to ease pressure on the Ukrainian battlefield.
In addition, Macron sent an important signal: the possibility of NATO sending ground troops to Ukraine is not ruled out. Although Ukraine's allies have not yet agreed on the issue, Macron said the hypothesis of sending ground troops to Ukraine "should not be ruled out" and said that each country has the right to decide independently whether to send ground troops.
"Anything is possible if it is conducive to achieving our goals," Macron said. And this goal, according to Macron, is to "prevent Russia from winning the war in Ukraine" in order to ensure the security of Europe. Implicit in such rhetoric is a willingness to enter into a conflict with Russia.
Macron's remarks sparked widespread repercussions and controversy. On the one hand, some agree with his position that it is a necessary move; On the other hand, there are also those who oppose it, arguing that it would be unwise to send troops to war with Russia.
However, in some ** arenas, the mainstream opinion is that Macron's remarks are just exaggeration, because Western countries, which are afraid of nuclear war, will definitely not risk going to war with Russia, especially if they send ground troops.
Although Macron's remarks have a certain deterrent effect, asserting that the Western powers "dare not act" may underestimate the history of the European and American powers and the nature of nuclear war, as well as their understanding of nuclear **. In addition, the strategic will of the British, American and other powers was also underestimated.
The Western powers' fears of nuclear war are legitimate, but in response to this fear, they may have two reactions: either retreat or take action to dispel that fear. Historical examples, such as the Cuban Missile Crisis of 1962, show the strategy adopted by the United States to dispel fear. Therefore, we should not underestimate the strategic determination of the United States, the United Kingdom, and other countries.
In addition, the colonial history of European and American powers such as Britain, France, the United States, and Germany shows that they did not lack an adventurous spirit, which allowed them to build colonial empires. In addition, there is a subconscious confidence in them that they have a better chance of winning in both conventional and nuclear warfare because they believe they have an advantage in technology.
In the Crimean War (1853-1856), the Anglo-French forces were able to defeat the tsarist army on Russian territory, in part, because the British and French ships and artillery were more advanced. Although Russia today may not be at a disadvantage in terms of the number of nuclear weapons, it is difficult to compare with the Western powers in terms of performance. This also begs another question: is Russia really willing to use nuclear **?
Kremlin spokesman Dmitry Peskov responded to Macron's remarks that "NATO may send troops to Ukraine", suggesting that NATO's sending ground troops to Ukraine could lead to a direct conflict between Russia and NATO. Although Peskov's response may seem redundant on the surface, it is actually perpetuating the topic of the threat of nuclear war.
Peskov's response was considered "redundant", since NATO ground forces have already entered the battlefield in Ukraine, and their discussion of whether it will lead to a "direct conflict" seems somewhat nonsense. Apparently, Peskov indirectly responded with the threat of nuclear war. Russia has repeatedly stated that "a conflict with NATO could provoke a nuclear war." ”
Just recently, on February 18, Dmitry Medvedev, a former Russian veteran, once again warned that a collapse of Russia would bring more terrible consequences than ordinary wars and protracted wars. Attempts to force Russia to return to its 1991 borders will only provoke a global conflict with Western countries using strategic nuclear **.
Putin also recently stressed that the war in Ukraine is about Russia's survival and future. And Medvedev has made it clear that Russia cannot confront NATO, and once a war starts, Russia can only use all means, including nuclear **, and the final result will be "common destruction".
The Russian top ** has already clearly indicated their position and the possible consequences. However, why are Western countries still insisting on providing assistance to Ukraine, and even suddenly signaling the dispatch of ground troops? The reason lies in two things: first, they believe that Russia will not use nuclear ** lightly; Second, they would rather take a risk than make strategic compromises under the Russian nuclear threat. Embedded in this gambling mentality is the belief that they have an advantage over Russia in a nuclear war.
It is almost certain that once Western countries decide to send ground troops, it means that they are ready for the possibility of nuclear war. If any unusual moves by Russia are detected, the United States and its allies are bound to take preemptive action. After all, Biden, Sullivan and others have repeatedly mentioned the idea of "first paralyzing Russia's nuclear ** command and launch center."
Elon Musk, the founder of SpaceX in the United States, once joked that if Russia launches a nuclear missile, see if it will "fly back"? Although this statement may be just a joke, it also reflects the skepticism of Europeans and Americans about the performance and launch status of Russia's nuclear **.
The United States spends about $36 billion annually on nuclear upgrades and maintenance, while Russia's total annual military spending is about $50 billion. These expenses are not only used to modernize the norms**, but also to keep the million-dollar army running. Considering that the upgrade and transformation of Russia's only aircraft carrier has been delayed, what about the maintenance of such a large nuclear arsenal from **?
This repeated emphasis on the frank discussion of the potential consequences of a nuclear war by senior Russian leaders speaks only to the fact that they are also worried about it. The notion that a person thinks he is not afraid, while everyone else is afraid, is logically untenable.
It is often said that a country with nuclear ** is not afraid of provoking a war. However, there are not many countries with nuclear ** in the world, in other words, none of the countries with nuclear ** have no bottom line. Moreover, the decision on whether to use nuclear ** or not is determined by the individual, and not by the so-called "will of the state", therefore, no one is without concerns.
During World War II, even an arrogant figure like Hitler had some scruples, and he hid his sister in advance. This shows that even such a character has its weaknesses. Therefore, the argument of "not afraid to wear shoes" does not conform to the logic of the use of nuclear **. Moreover, even if NATO intervenes in Ukraine, it will not necessarily touch the real bottom line of Russia's use of nuclear **.
Although Putin, Medvedev and other high-level Russian leaders have repeatedly claimed that Ukraine's success or failure is related to Russia's survival, is this statement too exaggerated?
In an interview with independent American journalist Carlson, Putin admitted that the attack on Ukraine was not because of the threat of NATO. He also said that NATO is just a political tool of the United States. That being the case, how can a small country, Ukraine, pose an existential threat to Russia?
Obviously, the "survival" that Putin refers to is different from the understanding on the field, but refers to the fact that if Ukraine "breaks away from Russia", it will be difficult for the "Russian world" in the hearts of Russians to be re-established, and Russia's vision of a "superpower" will be difficult to realize. In other words, the strategic thinking of the 18th century was deeply ingrained in the minds of some Russians.
Not so long ago, Zelensky once again assured that he would not use the long-range ** provided by the West to attack the Russian mainland. Obviously, the reason why he reaffirmed this commitment at this time is, on the one hand, to give assurances to Western countries that are about to provide medium and long-range missile support, and on the other hand, to deal with the possibility of NATO sending troops to Ukraine.
For example, even if Ukraine does not use the West to attack the Russian mainland, this helps to create an assumption that even if NATO sends ground troops, the war will only be fought on Ukrainian territory, and NATO will not launch an attack on the Russian mainland. This is consistent with Biden's previous statement that "the United States will not go to war with the Russian people."
Since it will not threaten Russia's homeland security, Russia naturally has no reason to use nuclear **. Whether the defeat in the war will provoke chaos within Russia is another question. It is worth noting that the Soviet Union once possessed more than 60,000 nuclear weapons**, but even in the face of withering and disintegration, it never considered "ending up with the United States and the West", let alone taking radical action.
In the event of NATO's involvement, one could result in two scenarios: one could result in a rapid compromise and withdrawal from Ukrainian territory, or a world war with a "disparity in camp ratio", the outcome similar to World War II, but with the possibility that some of the victorious countries would become defeated and some of the defeated countries could become victors of World War III. In addition, it must be emphasized that in the game of the Russia-Ukraine conflict, choice may be more critical than effort.